
Class _j z JZ7cQ^ 



Book. 



JCi. 



i7&^~ 



vy 






CONTENTS. 



THE ORIGINAL FORCES. 



CHAPTER L 
Necessity Page 1 

CHAPTER II. 

Necessity as a Force — As Studied in the Abstract and Con- 
crete 18 

CHAPTER III. 

The Creation of God — Aid given by the Necessary Laws — 
Change in the Possibilities 30 

CHAPTER IV. 
Man .... 44 



4 Contents. 

Jfart j&eomir. 

OF THE POSSIBILITIES. 

■ ♦ 

CHAPTER I. 
Of Species, Ideas, or Types Page 57 

CHAPTER II 
Things Possible in the Arts 11 

CHAPTER III. 
Things Possible in the Formation of the World, etc.. . . 91 

CHAPTER IV. 
The Good, the Right, etc. — Moral Necessity 106 



• ♦♦ 



fart C^irir. 

APPLICATIONS TO THEOLOGICAL QUESTIONS. 

♦ 

CHAPTER I. 
Of Sin, Evil, Foreknowledge, etc 129 



Contents. 5 

CHAPTER II. 

The same Continued — Future Punishment — An Evil Being, 
etc. — About Legitimate Theorizing in such Matters. .Page 143 

CHAPTER III. 
Providence 154 

CHAPTER IV. 
Prayer 16? 



• ♦• 



l§Ktt Jf0ttrt^ 



APPLICATION TO THE INFINITE, THE IDEAL, 
THE QUESTION OF PKOGKESS, AND LIKE 
MATTERS. 



CHAPTER I. 
Of a Perfect Being or Attribute 189 

CHAPTER II. 
Of an Ideal Thing, or Condition of Things 205 



APPENDIX. 



I. Tables Page 215 

II. Aphorisms 221 



SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. 



fart JFirst. 

THE ORIGINAL FORCES. 



CHAPTER I. 

NECESSITY. 



We are accustomed to think that every thing 
was created by God, and might have been other- 
wise if he had so wished. There are, however, 
certain laws which have always existed, and so 
do not depend on him for their existence, and 
which could not but exist, and so could not 
have been made different, or ever be changed. 
It is these laws, existing as forces in nature, 
that we shall first consider. 

These laws, taken in their totality, we may 
call necessity. They are known to us, in as far 
as known, chiefly in the axioms and deductions 



8 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

therefrom : as that parallels can never meet; that 
the opposite angles of intersecting straight lines 
are equal ; that the angles of a triangle are to- 
gether equal to two right angles ; that a thing 
cannot at the same time both exist and not ex- 
ist, etc. For we know that each of these holds 
every-where, and at all times, so that it was not 
only not necessary that it be created, but not 
possible, and that there can never be any anni- 
hilation or change of it ; and, furthermore, we 
know that God himself cannot exist otherwise 
than according to it — that is, have properties 
that it does not allow of, or act otherwise than 
according to it ; that is, these necessary laws 
are the laws of his existence and his possibili- 
ties, as well as of every thing else. 

We cannot say that we know these laws in 
their exactness. The axioms express them more 
or less indefinitely, and, it may be, only par- 
tially — that is, the axioms are not the full ex- 
pression of the ultimate necessity that underlies 
all things, but are rather that necessity as it 
manifests itself, or may be known to us — a piece 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 9 

of it, so to speak, or a phase. As in seeing a 
house we see only a side, so here we see some 
of the truth, or of this law or body of laws, yet 
not all. Yet this does not imply that we do 
not know something about this necessity, as the 
fact of there being such, and also about how the 
laws are. 

Moreover, we know rather the effect of this 
necessity than itself. We know that we are so 
tied up that we cannot make a triangle with 
less than three lines, or join two lines without 
making an angle. We know that all nature is 
bound up in such a way that when certain 
movements are made (however free those move- 
ments are) there will be more or less of these 
results necessary. If a wagon-maker makes a 
wheel round, then will each point of the tire be 
equally distant from the center, and any part 
be the measure of the angles at the center, 
(made by the spokes, for example.) It is the 
laws that cause these results ; but it is the re- 
sults, rather than the laws, that we know ; and 
what we call the axioms are, in a way, the 



io Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

measure of the laws, or the rule as to how the 
results come out. But while we do not know 
what the construction or force is in nature by 
which things thus work, we know, nevertheless, 
not only that as a fact they do thus always 
work, but that it must be so ; that is, they 
carry with them a necessity. We can say, 
then, that though we know not this force that 
we call law, yet we know the rule, so to speak ; 
or, that there will invariably be such and such 
results under certain conditions. 

We may not be able, in a strict sense, to say 
that there are laws, for men attach so many 
properties to their ideas of laws that there may 
not be such here. All that we can say is, that 
there is a force or principle in nature by which 
there will be certain results when certain con- 
ditions are met. We do not know that there is 
any thing like a constructed force, but it seems 
rather different, in as far as we know it, from 
any thing having construction. We do not 
know that it resembles any law of matter, as 
gravitation ; or of mind, as the association of 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 1 1 

ideas ; or any thing else that we are accustomed 
to associate with our ideas of law, except in its 
in variableness ; though this, even, is in a greater 
degree — absolute — and is necessary. We must 
guard even against such terms as force ; for 
though there are always such and such results, 
yet they seem to come of themselves, and to be 
in accordance with the laws rather than the 
result of them. When I make two lines to 
cross, thus, 



-B 



it seems that the angles form themselves spon- 
taneously, and that it is no force existing in na- 
ture tliat makes that AEC + DEBis equal to 
two right angles, or that the four are equal to 
four right angles, or that A E is equal to 
DEB. That equality seems to be a permanent 
existence, which my making the lines merely 
brought out into our notice, and that, there- 
fore, the angles are not caused, for it is really 



12 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

not those angles which I have made that I 
know — AEO and DEB — but those which 
they represent. However, though it is only 
those which they represent, or rather those that 
would be in case A B and C D were straight 
lines, yet it is true that there are here certain 
angles, etc., in accordance with the necessary 
laws, even if the lines are not straight. But of 
these, also, we can say that they existed before, 
and were merely brought out by the lines being 
made, so that I do not really make the angles, 
and that they are not made at all, but that I 
make the lines over the angles, that is, over the 
space in which they already exist. We must, 
then, guard against this term " force ;" and we 
may say in general that we know nothing more 
of these laws by which to characterize them 
than this, that on certain conditions being met, 
(as by intelligent beings, as when I make the 
lines, for example,) there will necessarily be 
certain results, or if not results, at least a cer- 
tain way that things shall be made to appear. 
We cannot say, perhaps, that these laws are 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 13 

above God, or existing in any way over him ; 
for just as we do not say that they ate above 
nature or existing over it, but think rather that 
they are a part of nature, and differing from 
the rest of nature in that they are necessary, so 
we may say, perhaps, that they are a part of 
God in some way ; for we do not know what 
he is in this direction, or what he is at all in 
his constituent character, so to speak, but are 
accustomed to think of him only as having, be- 
sides certain moral qualities, as goodness, etc., 
some great power — omnipotence — in a general 
way. Now we know that allowing him to be 
eternal, etc., these laws exist coeternal with 
him, and he being in accordance with them, as 
he must be, it is possible that they furnish one 
phase of his existence, for since they are not 
embraced in his works they must be embraced 
in his existence if they are in any way of him. 
Furthermore, just as his works go out from 
him, and are in one form a part of him, (in the 
shape of power, for example,) as they must be 
to be the result of him, so many works or re- 



14 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

suits go out from these laws, as the angle AEG 
when I have only made the lines A B and C D ; 
that is, there are some results or works which 
are the effects of these laws, so that we must 
attribute the laws as a part of God if we attrib- 
ute any of these results to him ; for these 
works are not what I have done, I having only 
made two lines. We say that these laws may 
be a part of what we call the omnipotence in 
God, they being a kind of power, if not the 
laws themselves, (as we understand them in the 
axioms,) at least the power or force behind 
them, for we have seen that there is a certain 
force which we do not know by which the laws 
or rules which we do know are made to hold, 
or rather by which the effects are brought 
about. By supposing these laws, or this power 
or necessity, to be a part of God, we get over 
the difficulty of believing that he is not omnipo- 
tent ;. for we can say that in not being able to 
work otherwise than according to these laws, it 
is only an inability to work otherwise than ac- 
cording to his nature, for it is evident that we 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 15 

must make this exception to his power at any 
rate, and in this we do nothing more than is 
generally done when we say, from our idea of 
his perfection, that he cannot do any thing un- 
just or unworthy of himself, that is, any thing 
which is not in accordance with a perfect 
being : so in our common idea of the power of 
God we limit his abilities, and there is no more 
impropriety in limiting him by physical impos- 
sibilities than by moral. The one as much as 
the other may be (or may be not) according to 
his nature. We say physical here to distin- 
guish from moral, not to imply that these nec- 
essary laws have any thing physical in them. 

Observe, however, that when we say that it 
may be that these laws are a part of God, we 
do not imply that they are a part that he can 
change, and that in going according to them he 
is only going according to his will, as he does, 
as we can conceive, in his moral character. 
We say that God cannot be unjust and yet be 
in accordance with his character as a perfect 
being ; but we say that God cannot go against 



1 6 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

any of these necessary laws at all ; that is, that 
he cannot violate this part of his nature — sup- 
posing it to be such — as he could, perhaps, if he 
were so minded, violate his moral qualities : so 
there is the same necessity for God to work (if 
he works at all) according to the necessary 
laws as if they were altogether independent of 
him and over him. This fact, which we must 
hold to at all events, need not imply, however, 
that these laws are not a part of God — should 
we have any reason hereafter to claim this — for 
to say that he could not go contrary to any of 
them would be only the same as to say that he 
could not be and not be at the same time, or 
that he could not be non-existent for a moment ; 
yet this last — his existence — we see is of himself. 
So we can conclude all the same that there are 
some things that God cannot do, whether it be 
necessity independent of him, or the necessity 
of his nature, that prevents him. We may here 
say, further, that if these necessary laws are a 
part of him, then it is not possible that he him- 
self, in as far as he should embrace these laws, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 1 7 

should be otherwise than he is ; so that whether 
it be or be not that God is a necessary being, 
yet these laws are necessary, and could not but 
have been just as they are. 

So we can say that practically these neces- 
sary laws are above God, and are independent 
of his will, so that he cannot be otherwise than 
according to them, or produce results otherwise 
than according to them,"* or in any way pre- 
vent their results, in case the condition of those 
results be met. 

* "When we speak of the necessary laws as existing above 
God or above all things, we do not mean that they necessitate 
God, or what God shall do, or that they have any active power, 
but merely that they are that according to which all things 
must be, whether done by God or otherwise. They are above 
all things merely in the sense that they apply to all, just as the 
laws of geometry are above, that is, apply to, all structures 
that are made, though they are not the force that has made 
them. [See Appendix for the elucidation, chiefly, of this and 
the following chapter.] 

2 



1 8 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 



CHAPTEE II. 

NECESSITY AS A FOECE — AS STUDIED IN THE 
ABSTKACT AND IN THE CONCRETE. 

An enumeration of these laws, could such be 
made, or a classification of them, together with 
the facts or phenomena that can be learned in 
regard to them, would constitute the science of 
necessity. This science is imperfect, and per- 
haps must remain so. We have seen that we 
do not know the ultimate character of these 
necessary laws, and what we do know (besides 
the fact that there are such laws) is the mani- 
festation, more or less distinct, which they 
make in the shape of axioms. The axioms we 
can classify and otherwise study, and this gives 
us an imperfect kind of science of necessity. 
In this classification we have some such general 
principles — as space, time, number, and quanti- 
ty — in which they inhere somewhat as in a sub- 
stance. Now we have in geometry the science 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 19 

of the necessary laws of space, in arithmetic the 
science of the necessary laws of number, and so 
on, though always more or less imperfectly de- 
veloped. It is not in accordance with our plan 
to enumerate these principles, or to trace out 
minutely these laws. . For practical purposes it 
is important to know many of them, but as to 
others it is enough, perhaps, to know that there 
are such. Of this, however, hereafter. 

These necessary laws are not necessarily the 
only force in the world, or the only things 
that exist, either in themselves or with their 
results ; for they do not imply at all that there 
may not be other things, as that there is a God 
who could create some, and who should be free, 
too, either to create or not create, or to create 
more or less. They only imply that they cannot 
be annihilated, and that nothing can be created 
contrary to them. 

We do wrong, then, to say, conversely, that 
every thing in the world is necessary, or that 
there is nothing which could not have been 



20 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

otherwise than it is, as many persons think in 
connection with their idea of necessity. That 
is, fatalism has no ground at all in the real 
necessary laws that exist. All that necessity 
embraces, besides the eternal laws themselves, 
is the possibilities that it leaves for other things 
to be done. That is, for example, the possibil- 
ity of creating a world like this, of making 
squares, triangles, etc. What is necessary is 
merely that if there is a world, it will have to 
be according to certain laws — as that it will be 
in space and time, be one or more, etc. ; or that 
if there are squares made, whether of wood or 
merely marked out in space, the angles and the 
sides will be equal. 

However, though these necessary laws are not 
necessarily the cause of all that exists or can ex- 
ist, and though the things that we actually see 
around us, as the world, men, beasts, etc., may 
depend on some other power ; yet the necessary 
laws have other force besides what they have 
in their form as merely necessary things. If 
God, or any other being, should go to produce 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 2 1 

any thing, then they would come in as forces. 
If, for example, he should make a triangle, they 
would come in and make the three angles equal 
to two right angles. If he should make a phys- 
ical world, they would come in and make it fill 
space, take a form, and make the lines, angles, 
etc., take certain forms, sizes, and the like. By 
that property itself by which the necessary laws 
disallow of certain things to be done — that is, 
things not in accordance with them — they aid in 
bringing about the opposite, or those that are 
possible. 

But this force, we may further add, depends 
on some other power, as God or man ; for the 
necessary laws could not produce any thing of 
themselves, that we can conceive. That is, 
from the laws of necessity alone there could 
never result a world, an individual triangle, a 
man, or the like ; so that far from the existence 
of these laws doing away with the necessity for 
a God, they do, considered in their exactness, 
require a God, or at least some power besides 
these laws that we know, to account for the 



22 Priiiciples of a System of Philosophy, 

bringing about of the things that we see in the 
world, though there is none required for 
the necessary laws themselves. So in one 
sense we can say that God is master of the 
necessary laws — in the sense that they can effect 
nothing without him ; in which sense we also are 
masters of them in some matters, God having 
so created us, as we shall soon see, that we as 
well as he could determine things into existence 
according to them. 

Since, then, the necessary laws are of certain 
force in the production of things, it is not God 
that does all, even of those things that he does, 
but they that help him ; and it is not we that 
do all, even of those things that we do, but they 
that do some. Many things, therefore, result 
from his actions, as from ours, that he cannot 
be said to be the author of, but which come 
from the laws when he does some things purely 
by himself. 

And this is so even if God knows the results 
that will come from the laws. In our working 
it is not always that our knowledge or intention 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 23 

is co-extensive with what we do, (in the widest 
sense ;) for when I will to move my arm I do 
not will to do any thing more, perhaps, and do 
not know any thing more than this movement ; 
so that the other results are without my inten- 
tion and without my knowledge, especially the 
more minute and remote results. But with God 
it need not be so. He can, no doubt, see all the 
results of his actions — all the angles, motions, 
etc., that will be produced by any thing that he 
makes, whether it be a world or a triangle. 
But even though he knows it, yet is it none the 
less the case that these results are necessary, 
and that he does not do them. With us we are 
apt to say that we do what we intend — that is, 
that the intention is the measure of the action, 
and that the rest is the result of the laws, etc. 
Judged by this standard, w T hat God does would 
be every thing, if it be true that he knows all 
the results, and must calculate on them all when 
he makes his efforts. Yet, though in this sense 
God does every thing, that is, in the sense that he 
knows every thing that will follow, it is none the 



24 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

less true that lie is not the original cause of 
it all. 

And not only so, but though it may be that 
God knows every thing that will result, it does 
not follow that he wants it all. For example, 
if he make a movement to strike a tree, say by 
lightning, he may know that the movement will 
make certain particles of air take the form of a 
right angle, and others the form of a circle, and 
that certain particles of the earth will be moved 
out of their place, all according to laws that 
are fixed ; yet it may be that he does not desire 
those things, even though they be necessary, and 
though he sees that they will follow ; it may be 
that there is absolute indifference to him about 
such forms, etc., he caring only about striking 
the tree. Thus it is evident that there may be 
some things that God does, or rather, that result 
from the necessary laws because of something 
that God does, which he does not wish to do ; 
so that we cannot say that every thing in the 
world is by design, every movement of a leaf 
or grain of dust, as some delight to say, or every 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 25 

storm or shipwreck. This fact is important to 
notice, as we shall presently make some deduc- 
tions from it. 

We may say further, that it is possible that 
things result from G-od's working that are even 
contrary to his desires, but which are necessary 
because of the necessary laws. So we cannot 
say that every thing in the world is according 
to his wishes ; but there may be things existing 
that he dislikes as well as we — the storms, the 
incendiaries, lice, weeds, wickedness, and the 
like. We say, also, that not all of those things 
even that he sees will result from his actions, 
are necessarily according to his will, or that all 
that he does (in the widest sense) is according 
to his will ; but many of them may be against 
his will, yet necessary because of the necessary 
laws, which fact will explain certain difficulties 
that we shall mention hereafter. 

We can say, then, that there are results from 
these necessary laws, and that the necessary 
laws must be counted among the forces that 
exist. Thej 7 do not, therefore, terminate with 



26 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

i 
their character as laws merely existing above 

all things : but they are running through all 
things, and are perhaps the most powerful 
agency that there is in the working of things. 
What we said, then, about studying these laws, 
or the science of necessity, runs through all the 
range of existing things. In the construction 
and conservation of the globe, of the winds, of 
the forests, of the rivers, of the cities, of the 
species of animals, etc., they are to be found in 
their influence. They are to be studied, there- 
fore, not less in the concrete of things than in 
the abstract, and the necessary laws are a part 
of every science that should be studied as mov- 
ing through the subject-matter of that science. 
They are in physics, agriculture, law, etc. For 
whatever is determined into existence must fall 
into the forms that are left possible by them, 
and to which they mold them, and so they can 
be considered as a force in that department. 
The science of necessity is to be studied induct- 
ively in the things, as we shall see, just as it is 
to be studied a priori in the laws themselves, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 27 

that is, before the things are determined there- 
from, or before the things left possible by them 
are determined to be made one way or another. 
We might make a distinction in this study be- 
tween the pure necessity and the concrete ; by 
the pure, meaning that which is eternal, and 
which would be even if there were nothing 
created, (nothing contingent,) and by the other, 
meaning the power that this has in the various 
forms which actually exist, (by creation or the 
like.) There is, however, no difference, for the 
necessary laws remain the same, unchanged and 
unchangeable, though for their greater or less 
power they depend, as we have seen, on the 
determination of the contingent things ; for the 
laws would be the same without creation, yet 
they would not be so prolific in material and 
other results. This we may call concrete ne- 
cessity, or the laws of necessity as working in 
tilings. It is true that they might have worked in 
other things, and so have produced other results, 
according as other things possible should be 
determined into fact ; (for it is evident that not 



28 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

all things that have been possible have been 
done ;) yet this is the science of the facts of the 
determinations. There might, perhaps, be a 
science of the possibilities according to the nec- 
essary laws, which would be somewhat differ- 
ent, though it would, if complete, include also 
the facts existing, for the facts are of the possi- 
bilities, though, they are not all the possibili- 
ties. Hence it is, that for the study of the nec- 
essary laws, as to their force in the actual state 
of things, we must apply ourselves to the facts, 
or study by induction, for in many cases, at least, 
we cannot see the reason, or any other cause, that 
should determine why one of the possibilities 
should be determined rather than another. The 
concrete necessity, therefore, cannot be studied 
a priori. But in our experience we learn as 
much of it as is needful, and the fact is, that the 
human mind is little inclined to study after the 
possibilities that never took place ; but when one 
possibility, or set of possibilities, has become fact, 
we pursue that with its consequences, as we do 
also the possibilities that are thenceforth further 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 29 

determined, and with these facts the mind is 
drawn off from the other possibilities. Tims 
we do not study possible history, any more than 
possible creation ; what would be the state of 
things if Pericles, or Christ, or Luther, had not 
existed, or if the Alexandrine library had not 
been burned, any more than what would be the 
state of things if the world had not been cre- 
ated, or if the law of gravitation were different. 
Yet all these things, with others, were once pos- 
sible, and the things that are might have been 
different. 



30 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE CKEATION OF GOD; AID GIVEN BY THE 
NECESSAKY LAWS; CHANGE IN THE POSSI- 
LIBITIES. 

Next, then, after the necessary laws we have, 
as forces, the creative power of Deity, the oper- 
ations of which are at the same time subject to 
the necessary laws (pure), that is, must be in 
accordance with them, and are the occasion of 
their force in contingent things. We know not 
how much God must have done to bring about 
his creation, seeing that the necessary laws 
would help him, so to speak : for, as we have 
seen, when he should merely make three lines 
to join, they would of themselves effect it that 
there would be a triangle with the angles equal 
to two right angles, and the greatest line oppo- 
site the greatest angle, etc. ; or if he should 
create a world in a globular form they would, 
without anjs more power from him, make the 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 3 1 

surface every-where equally distant from the 
center, and the diameters, radii, etc., equal, or 
equal in proportion to the approximation to a 
perfect globe. If it should be flattened at the 
poles they would see to it that the polar diame- 
ter should be shorter than the other, together 
with certain other configurations, such as we 
learn from geometry or the science of the nec- 
essary laws in regard to forms. With regard 
to the nebular hypothesis, we may say that if 
the worlds were evolved from a common mass, 
being rolled off into round bodies, made to 
turn, etc., the necessary laws would effect much 
of this when some things, as the motion and 
certain properties of matter, were once given 
by creation, (for these must be given by crea- 
tion, otherwise the phenomena of the nebular 
hypothesis cannot be conceived to exist, that 
hypothesis going on the supposition that there 
are such properties in the nebular or homo- 
geneous mass.) Those who harve followed that 
hypothesis have found occasion for very little 
original force, for they seemed to see that there 



32 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

was a certain necessity that things being once 
started should fall in a certain way of them- 
selves. It is nothing more than the necessary 
laws that have produced all this effect, except 
certain laws of matter, etc., which the Cre- 
ator put in. Thus creation, the creation by 
the Deity even, or the first that we can con- 
ceive of, must have been greatly aided by ne- 
cessity. We do wrong, then, to attribute all 
the laws which are seen in the formation of the 
world according to the nebular hypothesis to 
Deity, just as we should do wrong to attribute 
all to necessity. For the necessary laws aid 
creation, and creation, or the power of the 
Deity, gives the occasion to the necessary laws 
to do something, without which power of the 
Deity there would be nothing in the world but 
the necessary laws — that is, such things as we 
learn to be true in geometry and logic. 

We shall find it necessary in many things 
that will follow to make a distinction between 
what God does and what he does not. In this 
we need not be afraid of detracting from his 



1 

Principles of a System of Philosophy. 33 

honor, for tliere will some things be seen to re- 
sult sometimes that it will be more to his honor 
to attribute to some other cause. 

In the creation of the Deity we have not 
only special acts by which individual things are 
produced, as a world or a mouse, but also laws ; 
that is, he has imitated necessity or supple- 
mented it. Just as there is by necessity a law 
that parallels cannot meet ; that two lines can- 
not form a triangle ; that a circle has all points 
of the circumference equally distant from the 
center, he has made a law thatHbodies shall at- 
tract each other — the law of gravitation, the 
law of cohesion, the laws of thought, etc. ; that 
is, he has put laws in matter and in mind that 
' thenceforth would hold as strongly as the laws 
of necessity. It will be observed, however, that 
the laws of matter and of mind are not neces- 
sary laws, but laws that were made by God ; 
for we do not know that it is necessary that 
matter should attract, or that minds might not 
be made in which there would not be the asso- 
ciation of ideas, etc. We must, then, distin- 

3 



I 

34 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

guish between the laws of necessity and the 
laws of creation, as in matter. Because this 
has not been done, but all have alike been con- 
sidered axioms, many have been led to believe 
that there are no necessary laws, for they ex- 
amined the axioms, commencing with those of 
matter, and when they saw that they were not 
necessarily such but might have been otherwise 
they extended the conclusion to cover the others 
also — the laws of necessity — thinking that the 
axioms were all the same. It is nothing more 
than natural to*think that the laws of matter 
are not necessary. Matter itself is not neces- 
sary, that we can see, but depends on the will 
of God, and he could have made it very differ- 
ent, as far as we know any thing to the con- 
trary, so as to be incapable of taking so many 
forms, as solid, liquid, aerial, etc. The general 
laws of matter, then, such as we find them in 
physics, or the more special laws of matter, as 
in chemistry — the laws of the mind's knowing — 
in short, all the laws by which plants grow, 
*water runs, air supports life or flame — by which 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 35 

things are born and decay — bj^ which a tree 
takes one form and a man another — by which 
each thing reproduces its kind — by which we 
have hands, eyes, and lungs — by which we 
have five senses, one through the ear, another 
through the nose, etc.— by which we enjoy, are 
pained, remember, run ; are wearied, sleep, 
dream, etc. — all these laws were established by 
God. 

When, however, we say that God has formed 
all these, and that he might have made them 
otherwise, we must always have respect to the 
limitation we have made above. We have 
seen that the necessary laws help him, so that 
when he starts, a thing, so to speak, or deter- 
mines certain possibilities, the natural laws caiise 
a great many more things to spring up and fin- 
ish it. So also there are limits by the necessary 
laws which he cannot transcend, so that he 
could not have made things so entirely differ- 
ent from what they are as to contradict any 
thing necessary. When God made the laws 
which he made, (which we can properly call 



36 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

the laws of his creation,) he so made them to 
work into the necessary laws that we can often 
not distinguish the one kind from the other. 
For example, he has made the laws of matter 
so that we can hardly distinguish whether it is 
a law of matter or of necessity that two bodies 
cannot be in the same place at the same time ; 
that a thing put in -motion will continue for- 
ever unless resistance is met ; that matter may 
be divided ; that it has extension ; is indestruc- 
tible, etc. In fact, the laws of matter, as all 
the laws of creation, are made in part out of the 
laws of necessity. This will follow from what 
we have just so^n, that the necessary laws, 
while they limit the possibilities of the Creator 
in 'creating, so that God cannot create in one 
direction, aid him in creating in another direc- 
tion ; that is, they form some part, so to speak, 
of the laws, without the Deity, he only starting 
thern in certain directions. That is, the neces- 
sary laws are in the laws of creation just as 
they are in a h(fhse, a circle, or any thing that 
we make, they*making a great part in each 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 1J 

case. So, when it is a law of matter that it has 
three dimensions, length, breadth, and thick- 
ness, it is because of a property, so to speak, in 
the necessary laws, by which only three dimen- 
sions are possible in space. So, when it is a law 
that two bodies cannot exist in the same place 
at the same time, it is because of the property 
of the necessary laws, that any given part of 
space is limited, and it is a possibility left (the 
opposite of which is an impossibility) that if a 
thing be made to occupy space, more than a 
point, it will exclude all others. So when it is 
a law of matter that a bodv set in motion will 
continue, or if in rest will continue, forever, un- 
less disturbed by some other force, it is because 
of a property in necessity, by which, to express 
it approximately, every change must have a 
cause. The fact that the laws of creation are 
thus, made of necessity accounts, perhaps, for 
why we cannot distinguish readily in a natural 
law whether it is a law of creation or a law of 
necessity ; for it seems to be not so much a law 
of matter as of necessity that it has three 



38 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

dimensions, is divisible, etc. So when we say 
that God made matter, we must admit that 
the mold of it was already in nature, that is, 
the possibilities were there shut up according 
to which alone it could be, and when he once 
determined a few of its properties, the other 
properties followed as a necessity. So it is not 
necessary for us to consider God as making all 
the laws of matter. When he made one, as 
that no two particles of it should fill the same 
space at once, the law followed without being 
made, that it has length, breadth, and thick- 
ness; and others still, perhaps. We cannot, 
therefore, say which God did, that is, which he 
had his attention on when he made matter, or 
when he made any thing else, in fact. He 
might have purposely made the three dimen- 
sions, and the impenetrability have followed; 
or he might have made purposely the impene- 
trability for some reason, and the three dimen- 
sions, etc., have followed. He might have made 
one thing or more designedly ; but we readily 
see that from doing one thing, many others in 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 39 

such cases must spring up. So we can readily 
see how it may be that with a touch or a word 
he made all things, that is, merely by deter- 
mining one thing. For that one thing being 
determined, all the others follow by necessity, 
or without his further attention necessarily. 
We may mention in this direction that, for the 
same reason, it is not always clear to us in 
looking at the common facts of life, as well as 
at the general laws, which was the design of 
God, whether to make the mountain or the low 
places, for the one follows when the other is 
made ; or whether he wished to avoid the mud 
or the dust when he arranged things ; whether, 
when he made water, his attention was on drink- 
ing, or fertilization, or navigation, etc. Of this, 
however, we shall treat more at length further 
on. We see that God has not had to give atten- 
tion to all his works in making them ; that it 
is not necessary that he inspect the minutest 
particle that he works among, in order that it 
be made as it is, any more than we need inspect 
the minutest particle when we move a piece of 



40 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

wood, or burn it. Just as we do a little, and 
the existing laws help to the result, so he does 
a little, and the laws existing at the time help 
along the work without his further attention. 

After the laws of creation are once estab- 
lished, then the possibilities change; for that 
which is done thereafter must be not only in 
accordance with the necessary laws, but also 
with those of creation. It is no longer possible, 
not only to make a square house which shall not 
have four corners, but which shall not also rest 
on the ground, have the lower part stronger 
than the weight of the upper, have the parts 
joined, etc. Before the laws of creation were 
fixed there was no such necessity, that we are 
aware of; and if the laws had been made other- 
wise, there would have been possibilities and 
impossibilities as now, but they would not have 
been the same; and, for any thing we know, 
they might have been such that we could build 
a house with the foundation uppermost. But 
now it is as imperative to build according to 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 41 

the laws of gravitation, cohesion, etc., as ac- 
cording to those of geometry. The laws of 
necessity, then, and the laws of creation, go to 
make up a body of laws according to which all 
things must be. And not only do the laws of 
creation come in to make new possibilities and 
impossibilities, but, as will be readily seen, are 
also a new force that will henceforth co-operate 
in the work of creation, just as thWiaws of 
necessity, alone, did before; that is, they and 
the laws of necessity will together aid to bring 
about the things that are thereafter created. 
It is these two sets of laws that we call nature. 
It is in accordance with them, and by the aid of 
them, that men work, plants grow, clouds and 
winds are formed, fire burns, the seasons come, 
animals live and die, things appear to us as 
they do, etc. 

We cannot say, however, that God could 
not undo what he has done, so that from this 
time forth there will not be the same laws as 
before; for we do not know that the laws of 
creation are as indestructible as those of neces- 



42 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

sity. Yet even in this case, we can &ay that 
what is done must be in accordance with the 
past existence of the things which he has created, 
so that he cannot act altogether as if they had 
not been done. Having created matter, and 
.established the world with the laws which it 
has, he could not now make another world to 
occupy the same place. It would be necessary 
for him, at least, to first undo his past work, 
in whole or in part, as, for example, annihilate 
this world or remove it, or change some of the 
laws of matter ; so that there was made by the 
creation an absolute change in the possibilities. 

The possibilities, indeed, are changing with 
every thing that is done, however small, as one 
can readily see. Each successive work by God, 
or by whatever power, leaves less things pos- 
sible, more necessary, and fixes anew just what 
kind of actions are required to bring about par- 
ticular things thereafter. 

When, however, we say that with every thing 
that God does the possibilities (future) are 
changed, we mean, of course, the sum of the 



' Principles of a System of Philosophy, 43 

possibilities, that is, of the whole that are in the 
universe; though it may be that very few of 
the particular possibilities are changed. Thus, 
the creffcion of another man or tree need not 
affect the possibilities of God in the changing 
of the general order of the world. While, then, 
it is true that every thing that is done modifies 
in some way the possibilities of the things that 
may be done afterward, we are not to suppose 
that every little thing makes a great change. 

We must count, then, after the creation ot 
God, nature to include necessity and creation ; 
and as he goes on creating there will be addi- 
tions to this nature. 

Touching the possibilities that are left after 
each law of creation, or after every thing that 
God does, or man, we must, of course, take into 
the account the remote effects of such laws, and 
distinguish the possibilities which they make 
by those remote effects from the altogether new 
possibilities which are being made by subse- 
quent creations (original.) 



44 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 



CHAPTER IV. 

MAN. 

The next agency, after the necessary laws and 
God, is man. His work, however, is the same 
as that of God except in extent ; for if he do 
any thing himself he must create, for otherwise 
it must be the result of something else — as the 
laws. But besides the fact that we have the 
axiom that it is we ourselves that cause it, as, 
for example, when I move my arm, that it is I 
that determine that it* shall be moved, there is 
no reason apparent why it should not be so ; 
that is, from what we have seen of the neces- 
sary laws, and of the creation of God, and what- 
ever else we know, there is nothing tending to 
prove that the forces previously existing would 
cause the things that we do (apparently), or 
that we are not such as to do them; for we 
have seen that the necessary laws produce 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 45 

nothing of themselves, so that it is necessary 
that there have been some determining power, 
as God, to account for the things that have 
taken place up to the present ; and, moreover, 
it is perfectly in accordance with what we know 
of the necessary laws, and of the laws of God, 
that the possibilities will never be so filled up 
that nothing more can be created ; so that, as it 
is possible that God is still moving on creating 
things, it is not impossible that creatures should 
be made by him who should have a like power 
of creating, though smaller things, and on a 
smaller scale, according as he should see fit to 
bestow the power. 

Again, it is not such a great thing to create 
that it could not be that we have the power ; 
for however great it is, we can suppose God 
could make us so that we could do this,, espe- 
cially if he is so omnipotent, as the advocates 
of the opposite side seem to think ; for they 
seem to think that he has created the necessary 
laws, and could have made them otherwise. It 
is not. we say, such a great thing to create, for 



46 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

we have seen that it is proportionally very lit- 
tle that the being has to do that determines the 
possibilities— that nature, perfected up to the 
time, co-operates with him to produce the re- 
sults. When, for example, I make a fire, I do 
little more than collect the wood and strike the 
match, though the effect is much greater than 
this. It is, therefore, the laws that have taken 
it up, and carried on the effects to the ultimate 
result ; so. if a stone is at the top of a hill I 
may, by a mere touch, cause it to roll a great 
distance, destroying plants, trees, or houses 
even. Here it seems a great thing that I do ; 
yet I do nothing more than move my arm ; so ? 
too, when I touch off a cannon or ring a bell. 
Thus, though the effects would not take place 
without me, and without my originating some- 
thing, yet it is very little that I do. I do not 
even move my arnf, myself, but perhaps only 
make the volition, for in the moving of my arm 
there are a thousand forces that operate by 
which the nerves, muscles, etc., are excited, ex- 
tended, curved, and the like, all of which is by 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 47 

the laws of creation and necessity, and so out 
of my direction. 

Thus it is not much that man does, even on 
the supposition that he creates. We insist here 
on using the term create^ not because we know 
how creating is done, but because of the evi- 
dent similarity, as far as we can conceive them, 
in creating as done by God and the willing 
(free) done by man. Since our knowledge is 
more or less by comparison of one thing with 
another, we can understand the nature of the 
action of the will better, perhaps, by saying it 
is creation, since many have a somewhat de- 
fined idea of what creating means, namely, pro- 
ducing from nothing, that is, without any pre- 
vious cause, though they have not such a dis- 
tinct idea of willing. Now having shown that 
willing is such a thing as we commonly suppose 
creating to be, we can by this identification 
make ourselves to get a clearer idea of the one 
and the other. Furthermore, the analogy of 
willing throws some light on creating, as, for 
example, the fact known that in our willing we 



48 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

do not do all, but merely make one or two de 
terminations, when the laws and facts already 
existing carry on the result, leads us to see that 
it may be the same with God in creating, or, if 
we already believe this, corroborates it. 

There is, then, a creation by man, and the 
laws, though they do much, do not do all. The 
agency of man is the more important inas- 
much as his free actions are the occasion of the 
greater results from the existing laws. It is 
this human agency that fecundates, so to speak, 
the powers already existing ; and if man did 
nothing more than call <into power existing 
forces without calling into existence any new 
ones, his work would be important ; and we 
know not, in fact, that he does produce any 
thing new except the volition ; yet this has 
such power over the natural laws that it can 
bring into existence millions of things that 
otherwise would not be brought into existence, 
or can bring, by its choice of possibilities, mill- 
ions of things one way, which, if it had acted a 
little differently, would be another way ; or we 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 49 

can say, which is the same thing, that the pos- 
sibilities are somehow so near to being already 
in existence that the least force from the will 
will determine many of them into facts. In 
either case, however, the power of the will is 
great, for it is that without which these things 
would not be, however near they come to 
being. 

The will, we may add here, whatever may 
be its character, is not without being joined to 
matter and to the laws, whatever may be the 
substance in which they inhere, so that it 
moves at once on the material and the spiritual 
world, causing its effects every-where. 

In looking for the things that man has ef- 
fected we cannot hope to enumerate them all. 
Not knowing just what the power of the will 
is, and how much of those things that it is the 
occasion of is really the result of it, and how 
much the result of the laws, we cannot by ana- 
lyzing existing things separate into the original 
causes. In as far, however, as such separation 

is of use we can determine by the introduction 

4 



50 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

of another element that we shall consider pres- 
ently, namely, the moral quality. But without 
this we say that we cannot distinguish in things 
between what the necessary laws are the au- 
thors of y and what God, and what man. For 
the power by which to bring them out of their 
possibilities into facts is the same for all, at 
least in as far as we can distinguish it in the 
constitution of the thing itself, or in the bare 
fact of its being in existence, as a heap of 
stones, or a tree, or the law of association. 

But it must not be supposed that though we 
cannot minutely distinguish these forces, we 
cannot know in a general way. There is some 
facility in learning what man does from the 
limitation to the range where we must look for 
his work; for there are a great many things 
above his power, as the rivers, the metals, the 
laws of chemistry, etc., so that we need not 
look among the great things for man's agency. 
Yet even among the inferior we must not ex- 
pect to find all to be the work of man, for 
though there are some things too great for man 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 5 1 

there are none too little for God ; so tliat while 
within this limit we are to seek for man's works, 
we are not to take all for his. 

When, however, we say that there is a limit 
above where men can work, we must not take 
this in an unlimited sense, for it may be that 
men have some influence with God by their 
actions — as being good or bad — or by prayer, 
which question we shall consider hereafter. 
For we know not yet what power the provi- 
dence of God is exerting in human affairs, for 
it is at least possible, as far as we know, that 
there may be such ; and if man, moreover, exerts 
an influence on God, then the effects of man, 
more or less complicated with those of other 
forces, are widely diffused in nature. 

"We attribute to men, ordinarily, such things 
as aje neither the result of the laws, nor super- 
natural. Even if God, or some other power, is 
helping men in these, yet are they in kind the 
works of man, or such as men can do. We es- 
timate here the power of man, if not the indi- 
vidual facts produced by him. 



52 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

It is the building of houses, ships, cities, na- 
tions, customs, laws, etc., that we attribute to 
man. We should, then, guard not only against 
saying that God has made all these, but against 
saying that they could not have been otherwise, 
or that they are ordained by him as being what 
should be. We shall treat more fully of this in 
speaking of providence, evil, etc. ; but now we 
may say that it is not necessary either for the 
rising of a nation or the march of progress, or 
for the limiting of states, or for the cultivation 
of the fields, or the tending of flocks, or the 
education of the people, that there be any other 
determining power than men ; that when once 
they have done their natural willing, whether 
singly or collectively, the rest will be brought 
about by the natural laws, whether of the ma- 
terial world or of society. (By the natural 
laws of society we mean the possibilities — as 
limits or as forces — or the different ways that, 
according to the necessary laws, and those of 
creation, things can be, and so what state of 
things will result if one set of possibilities are 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 53 

chosen rather than another; as, for example, if 
there be ignorance that there will be more gov- 
erning by passion and more anarchy ; but we 
do not mean that there is any other kind of 
natural laws either of society or of progress, 
or of liberty or the like.) In saying that it is 
not necessary, as far as we can see, we do not 
say that it is not the fact that God overrules 
these things more or less. We must in all 
this recognize man as an independent power, 
having his works as really as God has his, and 
make these works of his a special department 
in the affairs of the world. This department, 
though it may have little importance in the 
sum total of things, is yet very important for 
us, for men are influenced, perhaps, more by 
men than by God. The laws that they live 
under, the ability of their parents to educate 
them, the influence of their homes or compan- 
ions, the wars, railroads, etc., which are in their 
times, and other such things, are the making of 
them to a great extent ; and then, in the indi- 
vidual, add the volitions which he creates for 



54 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

the formation of liis own character, whether he 
lies, drinks, debauches, etc., or restrains his 
passions ; and the works that he puts forth for 
others, whether he kills, defrauds, neglects, and 
the like, or is benevolent, kind, etc. This is 
especially great with rulers, contractors, in- 
structors, men of wealth, etc., for by the laws 
that men have made among themselves, when 
one of these men determines his will, there are 
a hundred others who will be influenced there- 
by. Thus the work of men is not unimportant 
for men. And here let us observe that if, be- 
cause there seems to be so much influence 
which others have on an individual, it should 
seem that the will of the individual, or rather 
what is originated by any one, is very little, 
that does not diminish even the importance of 
the will or creation of that same individual, 
taken in its full extent ; for though other influ- 
ences may be upon him so numerous as to de- 
termine him almost without effort or will-power 
purely his own, yet he in turn, by that little, 
influences, more or less remotely, as many 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 5 5 

others as have Influenced him. We are not, 
then, to lightly estimate the agency of men in 
things, nor to attribute the greater part to God 
or to law. But what we practically say that 
men do, we must acknowledge philosophically 
or really that they do, so that there is no dif- 
ference between philosophy and practical life 
as to the reality in this. This is important, 
among other things, as we shall see when we 
come to treat of progress, radicalism, etc., in 
showing that we should practice and encourage 
more the putting forth of original efforts con- 
templating great changes, rather than leaving 
ourselves to the current of events, seeing that 
we have a power that can call into being new 
facts and new forces. 

When we make as one department those 
things that are produced by free will, we in- 
clude not only the works of man, but of all 
other beings that may have the power of orig- 
inating, as beasts, should they have the power, 
for there is no objection that we can see why 



56 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

they should not have it in a limited degree, as 
we have in a limited degree when compared 
with God. "We include also angels, Satan, and 
whatever other powers may exert an original 
influence on things. Of these, however, know- 
ing nothing with certainty, we content ourselves 
with styling the third power man's ; for if these 
others have this power it is the same as man's in 
kind, as also the same as God's, that is, creative, 
and must have a place in this category. 



art Se^ttfr, 

OF THE POSSIBILITIES. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF SPECIES, IDEAS, OR TYPES. 

After what we have shown, it will be seen 
that it is only certain things that are possible : 
some possible according to the necessary laws, 
according to the necessary laws and the laws 
of creation together, and fewer still accord- 
ing to the present state of things. To find 
w T hat things are actually existing we must be 
confined within what is possible by all the laws 
that are above it ; yet, as we have seen, not all 
that is possible has been brought into existence. 
We must, then, make a distinction between the 
possibilities and the facts. 

The possibilities embrace, so to speak, the 
species, or the ideas, or the types, according to 
which all the things that exist, or may exist, 



58 Principles of a System of Philosophy \ 

must be. In other words, they are the laws, or 
embrace the laws, of the existence of things, or 
of things as they are or are possible in exist- 
ence. The possibilities are general, and the 
facts particular. Here we come upon ground 
that has long been disputed. For it seems to 
many that the species or the general are only 
imaginary, and produced by our minds from 
observing the facts, classifying them. etc. We 
can here understand what was meant by the 
ideas of Plato, and see the distinction between 
idealism and realism, or rather, we can see why 
such distinctions arose, and difficulties insoluble 
by those distinctions. It seemed to Plato that 
there are certain eternal principles or ideas 
which are as real existences as any thing that 
we can know, and which are, in fact, the only 
things that we can know with our pure under- 
standing, as triangles, circles, goodness, etc. ; 
that is, that there is really existing a circle, etc., 
in general. Now this we can easily understand 
and accept the truth of, though we may object 
to the way of stating it. According to what 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 59 

we have shown, it will be gathered that there are 
not triangles, circles, etc., but certain possibili- 
ties according to which all circles, triangles, 
etc., must exist. There is no objection to say- 
ing that there are real possibilities and impossi- 
bilities, that is, necessary laws which will allow 
of this and that, and forbid this and that other 
thing ; but to speak of these laws as being tri- 
angles, circles, etc., we have no warrant. The 
law is rather, that if lines be drawn in a cer- 
tain way there will be a triangle with certain 
properties, and if in another way, a circle, a 
sphere, etc. We can say, in other words, that 
there are certain possibilities ; that a triangle is 
possible, that a square, circle, number, etc., is 
possible, but that they are possible only in cer- 
tain ways 5 as that the triangle have its three 
angles equal to two right angles, and the great- 
est angle opposite the greatest side, etc. Tak- 
ing all these possibilities and necessities to- 
gether, we can call them the possibilities of the 
triangle, of the square, etc. ; but such possibili- 
ties there are for every thing that is possible. 



60 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

Just as a triangle is possible, or necessary, 
rather, in case three lines be drawn so as to 
meet, so a tree or a man is possible in case a 
world, etc., be made. There is wrapped up in 
the necessary laws an innumerable number of 
possibilities, or of things possible — men, water, 
thoughts, etc., as well as triangles or circles; 
and also impossibilities, as a free being necessi- 
tated, or water running up hill in accordance 
with the law of gravitation, as well as a triangle 
with four angles, or parallels that meet, or cir- 
cles whose arcs are not proportioned to the 
angles at the center. All things may be di- 
vided into possible and impossible ; not all 
things that exist, but all that are conceivable. 
Those that are possible, whether they are facts 
or not, we may call species or ideas ; or rather, 
we may so call the necessary laws in as far as 
they inclose these possibilities. But to say that 
there is any other thing than this possibility, 
that, as a species, exists necessarily, is without 
reason. All the species or ideas, then, that 
there are, are the necessary laws, or rather, the 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 61 

things that are left possible by them, which 
may or may not be called into existence. We 
can say that these possibilities are eternal, nec- 
essary, etc., and that they would be so if there 
were no world. In this sense, then, there was 
always a horse, a man, a circle, etc. Further- 
more, there has existed always, not only the 
general laws, by which it is left that a man or a 
circle is possible, but also all the minutiae — that 
a man might be made this way or that way in 
case the world was made one way, and differ- 
ently in case the world should be made other- 
wise. There is, then, a network, so to speak, 
of possibilities that runs as fine as the facts that 
exist or that would exist, however otherwise 
things might have been made. When, there- 
fore, we say that there are left by the necessary 
laws certain things as possible, and others as 
not possible, we mean not only the things 
learned in geometry, etc., but all that exists or 
can be thought of, in practical life as well. 
The only difference between these two kinds, 
or between what are commonly called the nee- 



62 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

essary or eternal truths or ideas and the things 
of common life, is, not that the one class are 
more necessary, but that they are more simple. 
It only requires in the one case that a line, etc., 
be drawn in order that they be produced, 
whereas in the other it requires that a world 
be created with certain laws, and that certain 
other contingencies be met ; that is, to form a 
triangle, or rather to bring it out of the possi- 
bilities into fact, it only requires to draw sev- 
eral lines, which we can not only easily do, but 
w r hich we can conceive anything almost can 
do ; while to bring a horse out of the possibili- 
ties into the facts would require so much more, 
that we can not only not do it ourselves, but 
cannot comprehend what would have to be 
done in addition to the necessary laws (by the 
creative powers) to bring it about ; yet in this 
latter case, as in the former, it only requires 
some things in addition to the necessary laws - 
to produce it. The reason, then, why the tri- 
angles, etc., were called ideas, and the things 
of common life not, is, that for these latter, as a 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 63 

horse, etc., there must intervene the creation of 
God between the necessary laws and what we 
can do or conceive. These works of creation 
fill up the contingencies to that point, and are 
incomprehensible to us. Yet, though Plato 
did not recognize the identity between these 
two classes of things his followers did ; for 
among the schoolmen there wete men claiming 
that there is an idea or species of a horse, or 
bucket, or grain-field, as well as of a triangle. 
But what we have said of the species triangle, 
circle, etc., we can say of a horse ; that instead of 
saying that there is a type or model horse ex- 
isting in nature, we can say only that there are 
in the necessary laws the possibilities left by 
which there can be a horse, and among other 
possibilities there is one that if there be such 
and such laws of matter, and such and such 
principle of life created, with such and such 
other arrangements, there will be , a horse just 
such as we have now ; that is, in the network 
of possibilities there is left the possibility of a 
horse. But while there is by the necessary laws 



64 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

left this possibility, there is not any preference 
by them for such a horse, rather than for any 
other that is possible, but that does not exist. 
Not only is it left altogether to other causes to 
determine whether there shall be a horse, (indi- 
vidual,) but also it requires that there be a 
great many conditions met, and some (that are 
possible) not met, in order that there can be an 
individual horse ; for if things had gone a little 
different at the start, or sometime back, it would 
be impossible that there should be a horse now, 
or such horses as we have. 

We can, however, here make another dis- 
tinction, namely, that there are species by the 
necessary laws, and species by the laws of crea- 
tion, and species by the state of things that 
exist now, by whatever force brought about ; 
that is, there are some things left possible by 
the necessary laws, which are no longer possible 
after some other laws have been made, as those 
of creation, and after some facts have been 
produced. So there are many things that were 
once possible that are not now. For the spe- 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 65 

eies or possibilities of things to-day, that is, for 
those that are in fact possibilities, we must con- 
fine ourselves to those that were left possible by- 
all the laws that have had a bearing on things 
up to the present. A horse, or the possibilities 
of there being such, is a species that has escaped 
through all the determinations of possibilities 
and the changes in subsequent possibilities. 
"When, therefore, we speak of the species of 
horse, or flower, or any thing else that exists, 
we need not compare it only to the infinity of 
other possibilities that were left by the neces- 
sary laws, but there is a more special class of 
possibilities in which it is contained. It is at 
the same time a species of the necessary laws — 
of the laws of creation, and of the actual state 
of things, however brought about. Now it is 
evident that there is a much less number of 
things that are so possible, than there are (or 
were, rather) under the necessary laws alone. 
We can say, then, of those things that actually 
exist, that they are species in a sense that the 

others, that once might have existed, are not. 

5 



66 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

However, it must be acknowledged that there 
are a great many other things that are possible 
tinder all the laws, necessary and created, and 
tinder the actual state of things, that do not 
exist as facts. These possibilities (of things 
that might be) embrace a species as well as 
those of things that are. The reason why the 
Schoolmen have enumerated among the species 
only those that exist, or the general type or 
representative of those that exist, is, that not 
knowing the possibilities as they do the facts, 
especially the concrete possibilities or facts that 
are possible in accordance with the world as it 
is, they could only generalize or infer the pos- 
sibility of the things that they saw. Further- 
more, those that had not become facts were of 
no importance, (though that made little differ- 
ence on the inquiries*in the time of the school- 
men.) It was certain that there was the spe- 
cies (possibility according to our doctrine) of 
horse, man, water, government, thought, etc. ; 
for they knew these things to be. 

The propriety of calling these possibilities 

I 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 6j 

ideas may be questioned. We do not say here 
that our possibilities are the same as Plato's 
ideas, or the schoolmen's species ; but we exam- 
ine the question of the ideas of these possibili- 
ties all the same. The ideas of these possibili- 
ties may be induced altogether from the actual 
facts, as the Nominalists claimed ; that is, these 
possibilities as known. We know that there is 
the possibility of a horse, that there are certain 
laws that shut up this possibility ; but while we 
know the fact of there being these laws, we do 
not know these laws, that is, what they are. 
Our idea of them we get mostly, perhaps, from 
the horses that we have seen (individual) ; yet 
these laws being different from a horse, the idea 
of them, should we have a perfect idea, would 
be different from what we know of a horse. 
The general idea, or image rather, that we 
have when we think of a horse, is produced, no 
doubt, from the individuals, though we have 
for the aid of this production the necessary and 
other laws, which work in our thinking (as in 
the things). To call that generalization a spe- 



68 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

cies, or to make it identical with the possibili- 
ties, is not allowable. If, then, we admit that 
that generalization is produced by the mind 
itself, and so is merely subjective, we do not 
admit that there is no species actually existing 
(objectively) in the shape of possibilities. It is 
true that in the necessary laws we know more 
definitely what is a triangle, and our idea or 
knowledge there corresponds more commensu- 
rately with the possibilities ; but in that case 
even the possibilities are one thing and the idea 
another. 

There is no reason, in any case, to call the 
possibilities ideas ^ for it by no means follows 
that because there are such and such possibili- 
ties w T e recognize them as such, much less 
that we understand them as they are. But 
from all that we know, it is evident not only 
that we are ignorant of what some of them are, 
but also just what it is that those are that we 
come most near knowing. But because we 
have a general idea of horse, which arises from 
the particular horses, and at the same time re- 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 69 

cognize that there is the possibility in nature 
of there being horses, we confound the former 
with the latter, and take the possibility for the 
horse, (the general type or measure,) or the pos- 
sibility of the angle for the general angle. We 
ought, however, to guard, on the other hand, 
against those who say that there is nothing of 
the kind, that is, nothing but the individual 
horses or angles, for we have seen that there is 
the possibility as a real fact, or rather, that 
there are the neces^ftry laws, and subsequently 
others, that are real forces in things, that de- 
termine whether there may or may not be a 
horse or angle ; so that, though there is no gen- 
eral horse, there is yet a horse or an angle in 
the possibilities. 

HerS we can account for how it is that there 
can be such a variety of individuals under one 
type, so to speak. For the old Idealists were 
much confused to explain, according to their 
conception, how there could be a horse which 
should not be altogether like the general or 
type horse, and yet be included under that 



JO Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

type ; in other words, that the type was like all 
the individuals, and yet not altogether like any. 
According to what we have said, it will be seen 
that the possibility includes many different 
things ; and that while it does not admit of a 
horse that shall not have weight, or occupy 
space, it does admit of any thing whatever 
within certain limits — the necessary and the 
other laws. It is not like a horse — this possi- 
bility—but is nothing more than that the horse 
may be one way or anther in case certain 
forces come in to make it. While these possi- 
bilities inclose a type, so to speak, for every 
horse, it is only a general type, and not a defi- 
nite thing which the fact of there being two 
individuals which are different would contra- 
dict ; but the possibility or necessity extends to 
the individual. For example, while it is al- 
lowed by all the laws that exist that the indi- 
vidual horses may be one way or another with 
a certain latitude, yet when it is once deter- 
mined that an individual shall have this or that 
characteristic, as a particular color, size, etc., 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 71 

within that limit, then certain other things be- 
come necessary for that individual, but not for 
other individuals. Thus the possibilities change 
with each horse after it is once started ; that is, 
for its completion it has not all the possibilities 
that it had before it was commenced. If it is 
once -made red, then it cannot take any of the 
other colors that are left as possible by the gen- 
eral type, which type (or the possibilities, rather) 
allow that a horse may be of any color, (though 
not of all.) The possibilities, then, embracing 
all that belongs to all horses, cannot be any 
thing like a horse. If, instead of horse, we take 
red horse, or lame horse, then are the possibili- 
ties still more limited, and for the individuals 
there is not so much latitude. 

There is, further, no reason to suppose that 
the things that exist are in their general form 
or species (that is, in the possibilities) ideas^in 
the creator, or in a perfect being. For, sup- 
posing that there should be one who knows all 
things as they are in their minutiae, and who, 
therefore, knows the possibilities, he would not 



J2 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

know the species or general possibilities of these 
things that exist, at least, not especially as 
eternal ideas; because, as far as the eternal 
laws are concerned, these things might be 
altogether otherwise than they are^ for they 
depend for their existence in their present 
form on special laws and facts that have, been 
since established. The general type of what 
exists now is, it is true, from eternity a possi- 
bility ; but with it are millions of others that 
have never been brought into existence. We 
can say, indeed, that it may, and must, even, 
come into the knowledge of such perfect being 
as a fact, but not necessarily always as an idea, 
or as a constituent, so to speak, of his thoughts. 
We can say, then, that though these possibilities 
are kmjwn to him, they are not known rather 
than others ; and further, that there is no more 
reason to say that the general possibilities of 
horses are his ideas than the possibilities of any 
particular horse. For there are the necessities 
that if there is this or that thing once deter- 
mined for a particular horse, then certain other 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 73 

things become necessary. The general possi- 
bilities, then, imply certain particular require- 
ments which it is necessary for him to know 
for the same reason. 

For the same reason, we cannot say that a 
triangle, or a circle, is the idea of God, any 
more than any particular triangle or circle, or 
any other possibility, whether general or par- 
ticular, which exists after such and such con- 
ditions are supposed to be placed. The possi- 
bilities, and the possibilities as they change 
according to each conceivable state of things, 
(or partial determination of the possibilities,) 
this, or to know this, we conceive would be 
the thought of an infinite being. But to say 
that the triangle, circle, ellipse, etc., that is, 
those of the possibilities that are known by us, 
are the ideas of God, is to limit him very much. 
For those that are known by us are not any of 
the possibilities themselves, but certain figures, 
etc., that would result in c#se we, or some other 
creative power, should produce something, as 
draw certain lines, for example. 



74 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

Here, we may add, is a science, (though it 
must be of an infinite being, not of man,) 
namely, to know the possibilities, not only in 
the first place, but as they remain after every 
change that takes place, (for, as we have seen, 
the possibilities change after every thing that 
is done,) and to know the possibilities as they 
would be after any state of things that might 
be determined on, and as they would be after 
the millions of permutations that might be 
made in each state of things. To comprehend 
that, may, as we conceive, be something like 
the thought of God. 

But it may be said that after God once de- 
termined to produce a certain kind of things, 
as men or horses, then " man," or " horse," 
becomes his idea. It is true that that state of 
possibilities which encloses such a being as man 
will likely *be known to God, as also the being 
(particular) which he shall make in accordance 
therewith; yet such idea is not necessarily 
eternal, and, for any thing we know, may be 
taken only a little while before the time when 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 75 

be produces such beings. We shall consider 
afterward the question of what is best, and that 
a perfect being would do it, and, therefore, that 
that which he has done (being best) was eternal 
with him. We shall hereafter advance some 
considerations to show that this need not be 
so. We shall now merely state that we have 
seen that in what God does he is much aided 
by the necessary laws, so that many of those 
things that exist were produced without his 
attention, and so cannot be said to be his ideas 
at all ; at least such is possible. 

Furthermore, God, in knowing what he does, 
knows the individual as well as the general, 
unless it be supposed that he somehow makes 
the species, and lets them, together with the nec- 
essary laws, make the individuals after he has 
once started them. This, however, makes no 
difference on the general point here. The indi- 
viduals first produced are as much his care (and 
they are individuals as the others) as the species, 
that is, the general determination of possibili- 
tieSj which, as we can conceive, he would effect 



j6 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

in making the laws as he did when he made 
the world, or made such to be the nature of 
the horse, and such the nature of man, and 
such the nature of water. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. J "J 



CHAPTEE II. 

THINGS POSSIBLE IN THE ARTS, . 

We have seen that some things are possible, 
and others not. This is a matter of import- 
ance in the arts. There are certain things 
that we want, but often it is impossible for 
them to be realized, or realized just as we 
want them. The question, then, is, what are 
the possibilities in the case ? and further, what 
are the possibilities that are nearest according 
to our wants? To reach that point, the best 
state of things that is possible, is the 'question 
in all undertakings. To illustrate : I may want 
to live on a high place. That I can get by 
building my house on a hill. I also want 
water, ease of access, shelter from the wind, etc. 
But there are here certain impossibilities to be 
met with. If it is a law that water shall seek 
its level, it will be less likely to be found in 
high places; the wind will be more apt to 



78 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

strike the house if on a hill, etc. I cannot, 
then, have-all the advantages of building that 
are desirable, the necessary and other laws im- 
posing certain obstacles. There are, however, 
certain possibilities left. I can remctve my house 
lower, and so nearer water, shelter, etc., though 
less healthy or beautiful, it may be ; or I may 
conduct the water up the hill, build stronger 
to resist the wind, level in certain places, and 
so make it easy of access, etc. But though 
these things are possible, yet is there the neces- 
sity of additional work — of this and that to 
bring about one advantage, and of another 
thing to secure another advantage. We shall 
speak after awhile of "the best" and like 
points ; but now we observe that there are in 
these things certain possibilities, or impossibili- 
ties rather, to be guarded. Things cannot be 
just any way. It may be possible to build 
easily with wood, but it will be necessary that 
it decay easily, or burn easily. It is possible 
to build securely with stone, but it is necessary 
to be more difficult. The possibilities are that 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 79 

you may have a well even on the hill, but that 
you must dig deeper. The possibilities are, 
that you may have the stables near the house, 
but that you must have the smell, fleas, etc., 
of the barn-yard. The possibility is, that you 
may live in the pure air of the country, but 
that you must be deprived of the crowd, stores, 
etc. The possibilities are, that you may farm, 
but that you let alone merchandizing ; that you 
may have much stock, grain, etc., but that 
you forego ease. Thus 4 are the possibilities 
inclosed by the laws, etc., of one kind and 
another, so that to have one thing you must 
submit to others that may not be desirable. 

This is to be looked at, not only in the light 
of advantage and disadvantage, but these possi- 
bilities are the limits of* how things may be 
under whatever calculation we make. If you 
go into a wagon -maker's shop you will see just 
how it is possible that things be done ; how a 
wagon must be made to be pulled by one horse, 
how made for two horses, how for four, how 
for oxen, how for solid ground, how for muddy, 



80 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

how for hauling grain, how for hauling dirt, how 
for traveling; what wood is best for wheels, 
how the iron can be gotten on them, how they 
can be gotten round, how the spokes can be 
made strongest, how made to suit the strength 
of the hub, how they can be fastened with as 
little holes as possible in the hub or tire; what 
tools can be made for each kind of work ; 
what form they should have, strength, size, 
etc. ; what variations are capable in them for 
adjusting to size, wood, curves, etc. All these 
things, when learned, constitute the wagon- 
making art. So it is with shoe-making, with 
carpentering, with hat-making, with engine- 
making, with farming, with surveying, with 
city building, with the writing of books, etc. 

In all the trades and professions there is a 
certain way that things are possible. To know 
these ways is to know to the same extent how 
the work is to be done. Not knowing as yet 
all these possibilities, (for our knowing of the 
possibilities does not necessarily run co-exten- 
sive with the existence of them,) we cannot, of 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 8 1 

course, do things in all the ways that are pos- 
sible, or the best ways even. To find out these 
unknown possibilities, and to adapt the tools 
and other means to them for farther utility, 
constitutes progress in the arts. 

It will be observed, too, that in all the arts 
there is the question, not only of the possibili- 
ties, but of the possibilities according to vari- 
ous conditions desired or supposed. There is 
a way to produce a mill without water ; to pro- 
duce it with little means, with the least means ; 
to make the most beautiful mill, the one most 
quickly fished, the one most suited to endure 
for the time desired, say a very limited time ; 
the one most for the convenience of the neigh- 
bors, the one most convenient for the miller, 
the one most convenient for the owner; the 
dryest, the most commodious, the one most 
secure against wind, the one most free from 
rats, or the one that is designed to meet several 
of these wants, some more pressingly and others 
less so ; a mill that will be built on the proper 

proportions, etc., etc. There is a way, we say, 

6 



82 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

for the doing of any of these things ; but that 
way is marked out very definitely by the neces- 
sities, more definitely than we are apt to see ; 
for in our work we only approximate to what 
we desire, even when we do not see but that* 
we realize our desire exactly. In other words, 
the possibilities run finer than our sight. So 
it is, too, in building a house for one or another 
purpose; a railroad or a city for this or that 
object ; in a work for regulating our life for this 
or that end, for riches, for virtue, for happiness, 
for fame, for power, for intelligence, etc. So, 
too, in educating others, in directing the work of 
others, whether in an army or in a factory, etc. 
In the department of government there is a 
search for the possibilities — the possibility of 
establishing a free government, a strong govern- 
ment, an economical government, a simple 
government, a thoroughly organized govern- 
ment, etc. It is a possibility that the people 
be free, but that demands a state of isolation, 
and of barbarism, perhaps. Is there the possi- 
bility of freedom and society at the same time \ 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 83 

For this it will be evident that the freedom ' 
* must be more or less curtailed, though the 
necessities do not forbid that there be other 
advantages more than shall equal the sacrifice 
of freedom, as trade, wealth, amusements, etc. 
It is also a question whether a free govern- 
ment, or government at all and equality, be 
possible, that is, a republic. It has been thought 
by monarchists that it is not among the possi- 
bilities. It is a necessity that, if there be 
strong centralization, there will be less liberty 
in the sub-departments, so that the possibility 
is limited here, and we must choose to have 
little central or less extremity of power. Power 
to compel submission necessitates less individ- 
ual liberty; ppwer t<5 coerce necessitates in- 
ability to vsecede; accordingly the necessities 
require that we give up state sovereignly, or 
a central government, in % country like the 
United States. The possibilities are not that 
we can always grant a " habeas corpus " and 
suppress danger, but necessitate that it be some- 
times suspended in order for the public safety. 



84 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

The necessities will not allow that there be sim- 
plicity of government and completeness at the 
same time, any more than they allow that there 
be simplicity of an engine, and strength, swift- 
ness, durability, etc. They will not allow that 
there be few laws, and yet laws to meet all 
cases that arise in a great nation of great diver- 
sity of interests. They will not allow that 
there be laws that will be good in one case 
without doing injury in another. Thus it is 
required, in order to make a government, to 
know what are the possibilities, and the possibi- 
lities for each desired end — for strength, for liber- 
ty, for equality, for simplicity, for sufficiency, for 
stability, for growth, for change, etc. The things 
that we want ure bound xtp. by the necessities, so 
that it is only some that we can get, and them 
with more or less evils. We may here say that 
the ends of the Socialists of France are bound 
up by possibilities that are very limited. The 
Communists, for example, who would have all 
property in common and all men equal in every 
respect, must forego liberty, it not being among 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 85 

the possibilities of thirds that men should be so 
organized, and yet be independent. It is not pos- 
sible for the free lovers to exercise their system 
and yet have parental and family feelings grati- 
fied. It is not among the possibilities to love 
all alike, and to have special friends or lovers. 
It may be another impossibility to love many 
persons very ardently, or healthfully, or consist- 
ently with mental strength. Thus, in all the 
systems of government, of society, of progress, 
etc., the possibilities must be taken into the 
account, there being always a limit of what is 
possible, so that that which we wish cannot be 
realized as we wish it, our wishes not running 
altogether as the possibilities. 

In jurisprudence we have to hunt out the 
possibilities. Here we can see why there are 
some things thmt seem so little reasonable in the 
law, and why there is so much of law, and why 
it is determined in the way it is. It seems to 
us that many things there are unjust ; and 
undoubtedly there are many laws that bring 
injury with them ; but it may be that such laws 



86 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

only are possible — tha#is, no better. # If they 
^ere different there would be other evils, and, 
perhaps, more. Thus, the law that the prisoner 
cannot give evidence in his own case prevents 
that the innocent be able to defend himself, 
when, perhaps, he is the only one that could 
give an account of the matter that would 
make it all clear to the court ; for that right 
could not be given to the innocent man without 
being given to the guilty, (for it is not known 
in advance whether the accused is innocent or 
guilty,) or without sometimes requiring one to 
give evidence against himself, for his silence 
even might then be interpreted against him, and 
so it would neutralize the advantages, perhaps, 
as well as bring other disadvantages. The im 
possibilities in the case, or rather, the limit 
of the possibilities, make that nve cannot have 
laws that will give us all the advantages of jus- 
tice. In the study of law, or, rather, in the 
making of laws, in regard to land divisions, 
titles, sales, etc., the making of counties and 
of districts, the establishing of courts, appoint 

• 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 87 

ing of officers, etc.,— in all. this we must seek 
what are the possible in each case. It may be 
test to secure always justice, always convenience, 
always satisfaction with all parties ; but since it 
is not always found in the possibilities, we must 
look in the possibilities for what will most nearly 
meet the wants. Hence, our laws of the States, 
of the counties, etc., are as good as they can 
be, perhaps, yet not without disadvantages. 
There is wanted a school-house in a "district 
where it will accommodate the most settlers, 
but that will not prevent, but sometimes implies, 
that it be farthest removed from the geographical 
center, and that there be great inequalities in 
the advantages of the inhabitants. Yet this is 
all that the possibilities allow, it being necessary 
that there be lack of accommodation some- 
where. 

These possibilities are very complicated, just 
as the necessary and other laws by which they 
are made run very complicatedly throughout 
things. This accounts both for why some of 
the things that are the best that are possible 



88 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

are not seen to be so, but seem to us defective 
or unjust, and why, in the study of law, for ex- 
ample, we must adopt the method we do. It 
is a wonder to young students why they must 
go back to the laws of other countries, and to 
decisions of courts, etc., instead of going each 
one himself to see what is right, for it is evi- 
dent that he has a mind himself as good, per- 
haps, as those who established the precedents. 
The difficulty lies in this, that the possibilities 
in the case are often so hidden in the compli- 
catedness of the laws of nature, the facts, etc., 
that for all the minutiae it would be impossible 
that one person should study them out ; so, when 
they have once been studied out, all the possibili- 
ties and impossibilities of a case being examined, 
and from such studies a decision made, if that 
decision is recorded it will save the one who 
comes after from making the same search 
among the possibilities in a similar case. There 
is in such case the probability that the former 
decision was as good as any that the present 
circumstances would allow us to make. Thus 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 89 

we have all frhe world, and men in all the ex- 
perience of the world, hunting for the possibili- 
ties, or the species, in the case. If we could in 
all departments — medicine, history, agriculture, 
machinery, theology, etc. have the decisions — 
recorded in the same way, it might be more to 
the advancing of those departments. Why 
should we, at every new case that comes up, 
decide in case a man buys goods from another, 
and leaves them in his store till the next day, 
and in the meantime the store and the goods 
are burned, whether the man who bought or 
who sold the goods should bear the loss ? If 
the thing is once recorded, then one can, with- 
out a lawsuit, go to see what is " the law " on 
the subject, and so settle the matter ; so that 
this feature of law, which seems little reasona- 
ble sometimes, is involved in the possibilities as 
the best. 

In the study of law, then, men are hunting 
the possibilities. Often they suppose cases, 
but more commonly they take those that have 
arisen out of practical affairs. Here, then, we 



90 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

• have an example of a knowledge* of the possi- 
bilities being developed out of our practical 
wants, which makes the law. to be an intensely 
practical department, as far as it is studied ; yet, 
though law is not an a priori study, it mast not 
be supposed that any of its principles can con- 
tradict any of the necessary or other laws of 
nature, or that in knowing these natural laws 
we do not know therein the limits of the de- 
partment of law — jurisprudence — as well as of 
every other department. Every thing in law 
is in accordance with the abstract possibilities, 
even though we cannot, in proceeding a priori 
arrive at the minutiae of these possibilities, or 
make the particular laws, any more than we 
can from the study of geometry without the 
d posteriori processes measure the different 
countries, states, etc., on the earth. It is only 
a case of where we find the possibilities chiefly 
by an a posteriori process. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 91 



CHAPTER III. 

THINGS POSSIBLE m THE FOKMATIOST OF THE 
WOKLD, ETC. 

What we have pointed out in the last chapter 
as applying to men, applies in other matters to 
God ; that is, there are some things possible 
and others impossible, and the measures of God 
must be confined to the former, however much 
he might wish it otherwise. The possibilities 
for men, we have seen, a§e rendered so partly 
by the works of God, especially his laws. 
"When, however, we speak of God in this con- 
nection, we refer only to the impossibilities im- 
posed loj the necessary laws ; for his own works 
were not before him as laws to limit him. 
However, we must remember the change in 
the possibilities as the work of God goes on, 
for there is a necessity, after the creation of 
this or that law or thing, that if God works in 
harmony with it he must work in a certain way ; 
and at all events, that the things which actually 



92 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

become facts change the necessities — absolutely 
— for God in his after- work. 

We say, then, that there are some things 
possible for God and some not possible. In 
other words, there is a species of the things 
that he can do. Here we see a way not only 
to justify God in what he has done, but also to 
answer those who argue that there is no God, else 
he would have made things more perfect. Why 
has God not so made this and that, it is often 
said — made that there shall not be earthquakes, 
winds, or rain whgi it will be destructive? 
so made the sun that it will not burn us or scorch 
our crops, or the rivers that they will not over- 
flow ? Why has he made that we must work, that 
we must carry water up a hill, etc. ? Anfl to such 
inquiries it is not enough to say that it is best 
as it is now ; that earthquakes, distances, floods, 
scorchings, famines, etc., are all for some good, 
for we can see at once that they are evils, in 
part at least, and we can easily imagine a bet- 
ter state of things. The only answer we can 
make to this is, that there are some things pos- 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 93 

sible for God, and some not ; and that it is not 
among the possibilities that there should be no 
long distances for the traveler when he has 
made a great world, and made men as he has, 
and that water should be ready at hand on the 
hills, or that it should only rain when it suits 
every body. And though we cannot with this 
explanation say that it is absolutely good that 
every thing should be just as it is, we can yet 
say that it may be the best that is possible; 
that is, that from the possibilities that are left 
by the laws of necessity there can be no world 
created better than this, lighted better, ren- 
dered more fruitful, healthful, beautiful ; be 
better supplied with beasts, fish, rocks, naviga- 
ble and fordable rivers, places suitable for till- 
ing, for railroads, for cities, for water-power, 
for reservoirs, etc. ; general laws of matter that 
would be better, special laws that would be 
better, as of gold, of quicksilver, of starch, of 
camphor, etc. ; those by which we can make 
brick, mortar, paint, oil, bread, medicines, ships, 
canals, governments, etc., etc. We say that we 



94 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

know not that these could be made any better 
from the possibilities that were left ; so that 
what is the work of God is perfect, as far as we 
know any thing to the contrary. 

"We shall not attempt to trace all the possi-. 
bilities that were left to God when he proceeded 
to create the world. Many of them are lost to us, 
being concealed in ^he complicatedness of the 
works which are wrought in accordance with 
them. Some, however, are very clearly de- 
fined. We can, for example, see that if God 
should make a mountain on the sea-coast he 
could protect thereby the inhabitants from in- 
undations, yet it would be impossible that there 
be roads convenient to the sea. So he could 
make more arable land within a given space by 
making no rivers, but then there would be no 
possibility of navigation, or transport (by water) 
of the products of that land. But while we can, 
in some cases, thus see the limit of the possibili- 
ties, in others we cannot. We cannot see why 
it was necessary that there be earthquake^ 
small-pox, rain, etc., (instead of a fertilizer less 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 95 

inconvenient.) Yet though we cannot, from a 
positive acquaintance with, the matter, say that 
that is the reason why God has produced such 
plagues, we cannot say that it is not the reason, 
for we can see how there may be, among the 
possibilities unknown to us, some which pre- 
vent that there shall not be certain of these 
evils. We know not that water could have its 
properties as water without having its present 
inconvenience as water. From all the laws 
that run through it, by which it is useful for 
drinking, for cooking, for washing, for fertiliz- 
ing, for navigation, for evaporation, (as in get- 
ting salt, the elements of chemistry, etc.,) from 
all these laws it may be that it is necessary that 
it rise from the rivers and seas and fall in rain. 
So it may be necessary that there be clouds, 
that there be no sunshine when it rains, and 
that it make mud, and cause rivers to rise, and 
occasionally to overflow, causing more or less de- 
struction. "We say that the possibility or set of 
possibilities by which these things are neces- 
sary, is, perhaps, the best species that could be 



96 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

chosen to be determined into fact. The thou- 
sands of laws that run through all the elements 
of chemistry, and of the worlds, by which we 
have the color of gold and the softness of mud, 
and the attraction of the stars, make it neces- 
sary that there be attendant evils. 

We may observe, moreover, that there is a 
wonderful flexibility or variety of possibilities 
that have been left, considering the infinity of 
laws that run through things bin^jng them ; for 
there is such an adaptation in the things that 
the Creator has made, that every thing in the 
world seems to be the work of design; that is, 
it is so nearly altogether good that it seems to 
us that it must have been wanted just as it is ; 
and some are even disposed to think that every 
thing is absolutely good. We refer to the many 
arrangements made by which men and all other 
creatures can have almost continual happiness ; 
that since they must have sleep, there is the 
night ; since they must drink, there is water 
at hand ; since they must eat, there is food that 
is pleasant; that all the senses were made 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 97 

avenues of pleasure, at the same time that they 
were made avenues of knowledge; that all our 
duties could be attended with pleasure, even 
those that are necessary, as of eating, of dress- 
ing, of preserving the species, of gaining a 
sustenance in life, of acquiring knowledge, 
of rest, of sleep, of activity, of spring, of 
autumn, of country or city life, etc. Observe 
that we do not say that this state of things is not 
the work of design, but merely that it is left 
possible after the necessities that exist — that is, 
possible to the Creator to produce, or possible for 
him to make us with this and that advantage. 
It is true that the necessities do not leave us 
without disadvantage, even in these advan- 
tages ; as to give us the pleasure of eating and 
drinking without the possibility of gluttony or 
drunkenness; the pleasure of clothing against 
the seasons, without the possibility of pride; 
the pleasure of love, without the possibility of 
licentiousness, etc. Hence arises the necessity 
for another law which he has put in us — 

the moral, with moral tastes — and for opposing 

7 



g8 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

the passions-, etc., one to another, as pride to 
gome of these destructive tendencies or possi- 
bilities. It is true, then, that though all things 
are not possible, there is yet a great latitude 
and great flexibility. We shall next consider 
some of these, judging of the possibilities 
chiefly from the facts. 

It is possible that in northern countries, where 
it is cold, there should be fat and fur on the 
animals. It is consistent with that, that the 
people living there should have food suitable to 
the climate, and have skins for clothing. Were 
such food desirable in the south, it would be a 
necessity that there be great inconveniences ; 
for it would have to be imported a great dis- 
tance, or fatty animals would have to be put in 
the south, which would be a great inconvenience 
to them. We say, there is a possibility, accord- 
ing to the laws that exist, that the people in the 
north can have suitable food and clothing, and 
the same in the south, for the laws require that in 
the south the people eat fruits, aromatic sub- 
stances, etc., and the climate is such as to pro- 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 99 

duce them. Wool, feathers, etc., are possible to 
correspond both with the wants of the animals and 
of the men in the climate where they are pro- 
duced. Vegetation is not among the possibilities 
in a cold country. It is a wise choice of the pos- 
sibilities in that case to produce animals that do 
who can live on bears. The fact of there being 
many or few possibilities of this kind— of adapt- 
ation—makes it possible or impossible to make 
a good world or state of things. Were it that 
only a few of these possibilities coincided, there 
would be few of the conveniences that we have 
now ; for we see that, in the polar regions, where 
it is not the case, there is scarcely any life or 
enjoyment. If it were not possible that things 
like fish be made, there would be nothing to 
live in the ocean, and, besides, there would be 
that product of the water denied us for food. 
Were it not possible that any of the beasts be 
capable of being tamed, but all required to live 
as in the unpeopled regions of Africa, there 
would be no possibility of utility between man 
not need it, as whales, seals, bears, and men 



loo Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

and them, and no possibility of men's existing, it 
may be. In all these things we may observe not 
only the possibilities and impossibilities which 
God must meet in making things, and among 
which he must make choice, (limited,) but we 
may observe also that there are possibilities 
that are valuable, or rather, that allow of mak- 
ing things according to our conveniences. While 
we see so many such, we ought, perhaps, not to 
complain that it is not possible to live where 
we will have all the advantages of cold and 
heat, of fur and ice and oranges. We may add 
that it is not among the possibilities that there 
be the blessing of ice where it is most needed — 
at least, most relished — namely, in the south. 
There is one place where the same laws that 
produce a desire for cold cannot produce the 
cold. For ice cannot be produced in a warm 
country, however much it is needed, and the 
warmer the country, the more is it impossible. 
The best possibility that is left is, that men 
and beasts shall like warm weather in warm 
climates, and cold weather in cold climates. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 101 

We may observe here that this law of adap- 
tation is itself one of the best possibilities that 
is left us, namely, that it is possible that a law- 
may be made — that is, that the thing is possible 
— that if we be placed in the south, we will 
conform in our wants to the south, and that if in 
the north, we will conform to the cold, the fat, 
etc., so that the things that are possible there will 
be the things wanted, which law runs not only 
through climatic influences, but through all 
things else nearly. The man who becomes 
learned is adapted to enjoy the things that the 
learned man meets with; the ignorant man to 
enjoy such as he can have, and to care for no 
other ; the rich to enjoy riches ; the great to 
have his delight in fame, power, etc. ; the good 
in goodness ; the cow in grass ; the hog in corn ; 
the squirrel in nuts ; the serpent in poisons ; 
the lion in killing and in food. The shoemaker 
can enjoy that trade ; the miller, the lawyer, the 
trader, the writer— each can enjoy his work. 
The man who works finds work a necessity, and 
will become dyspeptic if he stops, his necessities 



102 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

creating his wants. So in privations we may 
contract ourselves to endure them. We do not 
say that in none of these things there are evils 
that are necessitated, but that there is an adap- 
tation which is, on the whole, good. This was 
possible when God created the world, and he 
has chosen it for us. The evils were necessary, 
and he could not avoid them. 

The influences of climate, of sea life, of fron- 
tier life, etc., though they draw men from a 
correspondence with other men in manners and 
morals, yet adapt men to a life which is more 
or less relished and useful, though repugnant 
to others, it may be, and not unattended with 
real evils. These are some of the possibili- 
ties that were left to the Creator in produc- 
ing things, and some of them even are necessi- 
ties, it may be — some of the good as well as the 
bad — so that they result of themselves from the 
necessary laws when he but determines one 
thing ; so that we cannot say that all are de- 
signedly chosen, even of the good possibilities, 
which are determined into fact, and which we 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 103 

are enjoying now ; but It may be that the hair 
necessarily becomes thin or falls off in the south, 
and that beasts grow fat and woolly in the 
north, by some of the necessary laws of heat, 
cold, etc., or something that results from what 
God did in attending to other things ; so that this 
adaptation or suiting of beasts to climate is not 
necessarily his design. Design, then, is not to 
be considered co-extensive with the suitableness 
in things any more than with the things that 
are existing in the world. Yet this does not 
take away all evidence of design ; for though 
it be possible that some of the good things result 
from the necessities, it is not conceivable that 
there should be by chance such a wide correspon- 
dence of that which is to that w T hich ought to be ; 
for we have seen that the correspondence is so 
great that many persons think that every thing 
which is, is good. Besides, it is an axiom that 
things could not come into existence from the 
necessary laws without some determining agent, 
so that the work, if not the design, of a creator 
is evident. Furthermore, to suppose that of all 



104 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

the infinities of things that are left possible by 
the necessary laws, as many bad as good, there 
would be produced those that are good, with no 
more mixture of the bad than is necessary to 
secure the good, and the greatest good, as far 
as we can see, is the same as to say that if a lot 
of bricks were thrown down promiscuously 
they would produce, spontaneously, the best 
house that is possible for those bricks to consti- 
tute. That is, the argument for design, drawn 
from the adaptations in things, is in no way 
diminished by what we have shown elsewhere, 
namely, that there are things that result of 
themselves from the necessary laws. For we 
find in necessity no design that we can see, or 
any favoring of the good rather than the bad. 
In natural theology the design, we may remark, 
should be looked at from these considerations. 
That is, we should take into the account that 
some things are possible, others necessary, and 
others necessary in case certain ones are deter- 
mined ; so that we do not attribute too widely 
to design, or attribute things unworthy of a 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 105 

Creator. This thing, however, we should do in 
every science — this estimating of the possibili- 
ties, necessities, etc., and the attributing of 
things to their proper cause. 

The possibilities that we have considered thus 
far are those that are bounded necessarily. 
Whatever may be the power of God, or his 
character, there must still be these possibilities 
without his being able to go beyond them. 
We shall presently mention what further ne- 
cessities his character as a perfect being im- 
poses, and thereby limits again his possibilities. 
Such we may call moral necessities to distin- 
guish from those already mentioned, or the 
natural necessities. We may mention also the 
limits which any special design imposes. 



106 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 



CHAPTER IV. 

"THE GOOD," "THE BIGHT," ETC. — MORAL NE- 
CESSITY. 

Now is there any such thing in nature as " the 
good," ■<■ the right, 5 ' " the perfect," etc., just as 
there is the square, the triangle, or the circle ? 
We have seen that the " triangle," etc., that is, 
the species, or idea, or type, is nothing else 
than the possibilities left by the necessary laws, 
by which it is possible to make a certain figure, 
and which will then have necessarily certain 
properties; and that besides this there is no 
real existence that we can call a triangle or a 
square ; and that in this it is no otherwise than 
a bucket, or a horse, or any thing else that can 
exist, for of this also there is the possibility or 
the species. In the same way we can say that 
there is " the good," " the bad," etc. ; that is, 
that there is the possibility or species left by 
the necessary laws, by which there can be pro- 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 107 

duced pleasure, pain, or some such thing or set, 
of things, that we can call good. Let us examine 
some of these possibilities, and we will perhaps 
arrive at a knowledge of what the "good" is. 
There is the possibility, for example, (that is, it 
is one among the species,) that there be order 
in the things that may be created ; that is, that 
they can have certain relations of number, size, 
form, etc., that will please, and conversely that 
beings may be produced that shall like this 
order; that is, beings having a sense of beauty, 
sublimity, etc.; and also that creatures may be 
variously made to enjoy themselves with one 
thing or another ; that appetites, as we have 
seen, may be placed in them, and, fruit in the 
world, by which there can spring up desires, 
relish, etc. ; that resemblances and differences 
may be made among creatures, by which they 
shall love 9 as parent and child, husband and 
wife, friends, coreligionists, etc. ; and a great 
many other things that give pleasure, or some- 
thing of the kind that is desirable. It is these 
possibilities, taken together, that we call the 



108 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

good — that is, the species — even though we do 
not know the extent of the possibilities, or just 
what any of them exactly is. What is pro- 
duced in accordance with these species, that is, 
when they are filled up, we call good, (or good 
things,) in the sense that we call the individual 
a triangle. That will, then, be the greatest 
good, as species, or as fact, which expresses the 
greatest possible amount in this direction ; that 
is, the greatest amount — actual — that may be 
produced in accordance with the species or pos- 
sibilities, that is, with all the species or possi- 
bilities that exist. This will be " the good," or 
" the greatest good," even if it is not realized 
or determined into fact. 

Now for God to be good, or adopt a policy 
of good, he must seek this whole or greatest 
good, or bring it about rather, since it is possi- 
ble, and he all powerful. 

But it will be observed that this greatest 
good is not unlimited. Though there are some 
things possible that are good, (that is, pleasant, 
beautiful, orderly, consistent, etc.,) yet not all 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 109 

that is possible is such. This we know from 
the facts around us; for since there are evils, 
there is the possibility of these evils. What 
these evils are we shall consider presently. 
Nor is all that is good possible. We have seen 
in the last chapter that there are some things 
that God cannot do, as well as some that he 
can do, and that among those that are not possible 
for him are yet some that would be good ; as if 
he could make sites for houses that would 
have all the advantages of high and low places. 
When, therefore, we say the good or the great- 
est good, we do not mean any thing absolutely 
good, or good without any defects, but the 
greatest good that is possible. 

Now what state of things this would be if it 
were all wrought out into facts (that is, if all 
the possibilities which express the greatest good 
were determined to fact) we do not know ; but 
we may suppose that the actual state of things, 
in as far as produced by God, is such, the evils 
that we find being necessary as possibilities, 
and which we, or other free beings, have 



no Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

brought into fact, thereby deflecting the actual 
state from the best that is possible : so, though 
we may be of some certainty that things as 
produced by God express the greatest good 
embraced in the possibilities, yet we do not 
know what this best state is, since the things 
are not altogether in accordance with it now. 
We say, however, that this best state of 
things, or the highest good, is that which 
would result if all the possibilities of the good 
were realized. 

If, in proceeding to fill up these possibilities, 
or bring about this best state, one should go 
constantly in accordance with it, then the good, 
that is, the greatest good, would never change; 
but when all the possibilities were filled up it 
would be the greatest good allowed by the pos- 
sibilities as left by the necessary laws. But if 
there should be made an error, and something 
be done that is not the best, or in accordance 
with the best, then the good from that point 
forward will be altered ; that is, the highest 
good that is thenceforth possible will be reached 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 1 1 1 

(that is, the whole of it) by taking a different 
course; and if that course be followed through- 
out, the greatest good, when reached, will not, 
indeed, be equal to the greatest good as it was 
before, (that is, was possible,) yet will be the 
greatest good possible after that error. And if 
there be made other errors there will be just as 
often a change in that which will be the best 
thenceforth, so that if there be many errors, 
whether by angels, devils, or men, (for we can 
conceive all such powers as doing what ought 
not to be done,) the greatest good that can be 
reached will be very far from the greatest good 
that was possible in the first place. We do not 
say that an error, as by a man, for example, 
will make a change that will work very widely 
against realizing the greatest possible good, yet 
it will make a change, and require, perhaps, in 
order that the evil be as little as possible, that 
there be a good many other measures taken 
that will further change things, which would 
not have been required had that failure not 
been made. It is as if a drop of water should 



112 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

fall into the ocean. It would not change per- 
ceptibly the ocean, yet it would cause the whole 
relations of the ocean to change, as in the num- 
ber of drops, the place of the center of gravity, 
etc., and would require a change in the line, 
should it be drawn, which would divide the 
ocean in half, in thirds, in fourths, etc. We 
say that any such departure from the working 
which would bring about the greatest good 
would require a change in the course which, 
should it be followed, would thenceforth bring 
about the greatest good (that is still left possi- 
ble) ; and not only so, but it may require meth- 
ods, as remedies, etc., which would otherwise not 
be good, and which in themselves may be evil, 
but relatively a good, being meant to prevent 
some greater evil. We can say that God may be 
the author of such, even if they are not agreeable, 
or in any way in accordance with what would 
be the best in case there had been no deviation 
from the good. So we can attribute to him, 
perhaps, some things — as diseases, drouth, weeds, 
toil, and other scourges — as rejnedies for greatei 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 1 1 3 

evils. Of this, however, we shall speak here- 
after. 

We say, then, that there are changes in the pos- 
sibilities for the greatest good ; so that the system 
of measures that would be best after one error 
would not be after two, or three, or many ; and 
the net-work of possibilities inclosing the best, 
as the actual course of things proceeds down the 
ages, is so changing, that a plan, whether of 
God or any other power, that should be chosen 
to bring about the best after every transgression 
of it, would not be apt to be very regular or 
of a piece. That is, the operations of God (for 
we can suppose him to be all the time seeking 
to produce the best out of the possibilities) 
would not be very uniform. 

Since, then, we must mean by " the good " a 

changing thing, namely, the best that is possible 

at a given time, there is no absolute state of 

things that can be called " the good," and which 

can be supposed to exist independent of the 

facts that actually exist or have existed. We 

can say that there was once such a good ; but it 

8 



H4 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

was only of the same kind as that which we 
have now, except that there were wider possi- 
bilities. It was when there was not yet any 
thing done — that is, any of the possibilities de- 
termined into facts; but that was a good that 
existed at a particular time, and not an eternal 
species, like the triangle, that is not changed by 
the events as they occur. 

The highest conception of a good being that 
we can have, is of one that is ever watching the 
possibilities to bring about the greatest good, 
changing with the changes in the possibilities, 
and unchangeable only in his keeping to the 
greatest good that at each stage is possible. 

We have seen that there are certain possibi- 
lities — a possibility for pleasure, for a bucket, for 
an angle, etc. Now, we may group these possi- 
bilities one way or another at will, and call the 
state that conforms thereto " the good," " the 
just," " the right," or any thing else. " The 
good," as commonly understood, is an expression 
of a grouping that includes all the possibilities 
in a certain direction. Observe, however, that 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 115 

though this grouping of the possibilities is arbi- 
trary, and might have been made otherwise than 
accords with what we mean by " the good," 
" the just," etc., that the possibilities are not ; 
but they really exist in nature. It is as if the 
water of the ocean should be divided into hogs- 
heads, barrels, etc. We might make a calcula- 
tion according to one measure or system of 
measuring, or according to another, and yet the 
quantities would remain the same, and be real 
quantities, though the number of barrels or litres 
or pounds would not. So though there may 
not be such a relation as the just, the right, 
etc., which expresses any special divisions, so to 
speak, of the possibilities as they are in nature, 
yet there are such things as w r e mean by the 
right, the just, etc., existing in the possibilities. 
There are, we say, certain possibilities in na- 
ture for the producing of water, others for the 
producing of air, others for thought, etc. So 
there are certain possibilities for producing, say 
equity — that is, for giving to one and to another 
according to what they have done. This is " the 



Ii6 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

just." To observe these possibilities, or, rather, 
to work according to them, or up to the full that 
they allow, is to be perfectly just. But observe, 
as we showed in the case of " the good " as a 
whole, that " the just " is limited —that is, the 
possibility (to express it approximately) of 
awarding to each according to what he has done. 
It may not be possible to make an equitable 
division. To illustrate from common affairs — it 
may not be possible, in a court, to give to each 
of tw r o clients what is due him, because of some 
that must be taken for the costs. So, in the 
question of property, it is not just that a man 
born rich should have so much more than, one 
born poor, since both are equal by nature, and 
one has not deserved more ; yet it is unavoidable. 
The just may deserve rain and the unjust drought 
in the moral government ; but it is impossible, 
according to the laws of nature, that if there 
be rain, it should not rain upon both ; so that 
they do not receive according to their merits : 
and it would be impossible, no doubt, from the 
nature of things necessary, to effect that justice 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 117 

should always be rendered. But though the 
just is limited — that is, though there cannot be 
the absolutely just any more than the absolutely 
good (or sum of the virtues) or the absolutely 
pleasant, orderly, simple, etc., yet there are 
certain possibilities in this direction. This is 
the extent of practicable justice. 

But, even if absolute justice had been possible 
once, it is evident, at least, that it is not possible 
now, after things have advanced as we find them 
in our affairs. So we must make a distinction 
between the possibilities or species — whether in 
the first place or at any time in the course of 
the production of things — and the perfect ideal 
which we have of "the just," namely, that 
according to which there would be nothing else 
than reward according to merit. 

It is, then, only these actual possibilities that 
we have as " the just," " the beautiful," " the 
right," etc., and there need be nothing in nature 
corresponding to a more absolute type. God, 
it seems, must meet in his moral government, 
as well as in his physical, certain impossibilities, 



n8 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

and one may be to render justice (perfect) ; so 
that many sinners may escape, and many 
righteous suffer, in the actual state of things. 
So it may not be possible that there be happi- 
ness, order — in short all things every-where 
satisfactory (considered morally) ; or that the 
laws of the moral government even be exactly 
what God would have them, etc., etc. 

But the question may arise, What is this 
greater justice, if it be not, as we have seen, any 
real species or any existing thing answering to 
our ideal ? We may say, perhaps, that it is 
nothing more than an ideal. But it is some- 
thing that we can conceive of, and wish for 
even, though it is not a thing existing or pos- 
sible. We can conceive of a power greater 
than that which God has, namely, a power that 
could go contrary to the necessary laws — that 
could make a triangle with two sides, or whose 
angles would not equal two right angles. Or 
we can conceive of a state of things, according 
to which one might have on a hill the advan- 
tages of both hill and valley — that water should 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 119 

run up, that wind should not strike it, etc. — and 
all in accordance with the natural laws. But, 
though we can conceive this, that is, think of 
it, and wish that it were so, yet it were impos- 
sible ; that is, we can think of some advantages 
that cannot exist. So we can think of greater 
justice, where it would not be limited by its 
present impossibilities ; of greater goodness — 
a goodness, for example, that would not dislike 
sin, even though it liked righteousness, that 
would not love the sinner less, even though it 
loved the righteous more; of greater mercy, 
that would not punish sin, even though it re- 
warded according to what is good, etc. These 
things are simply impossible, though we can 
conceive them; so that there are things con- 
ceivable, and good things, that cannot be. We 
can conceive that God even would like some 
of these things, as to create men free who 
should not sin ; or correct sinners, and yet not 
scourge the righteous. We can conceive, we 
say, that God should see this better state of 
filings which is impossible. We can say, then, 



120 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

that though this ideal exists nowhere else than 
in our ideas, we can at least have ideas of 
things, and wishes for things, better than any 
things that exist or are possible ; and that we 
can be better than nature allows us to carry out 
our goodness, or, at least, that God's goodness 
is not limited by the possibilities, or his wishes 
by the best possible state of things. If, then, 
it should seem to us that things are not perfect, 
(morally,) we cannot infer so of God, since we 
can conceive that he might wish things better. 
There is, then, a conceivable state of perfection, 
of goodness, of justice, etc., above the possible 
state. That, as far as we can see, must be the 
state that is according to the character of God — 
according to his wishes and (could his wishes be 
carried out) according to his design. There we 
must look for the attributes of God, especially his 
moral attributes; for his physical attributes, as 
his power, are measured by the possible state of 
things, not by the conceivable ; but his wishes, 
no doubt, go out into the conceivable beyond 
the possible. In this conceivable state of things 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 121 

we get the just, the pleasant, the merciful, the 
good, etc., to be something different (from the 
actual or possible.) 

Now, if this be the measure of the character 
of God — that is, if he be in his wishes, plans, 
etc., according to this conceivable state of things, 
then we can say that God is limited in what he 
does by another necessity — a moral necessity. 
And even if he does not wish, or is not after 
this state of things, yet, if he be good, just, etc., 
to the degree that is possible even, then he 
must be limited by this perfection necessity. Of 
those things, that are possible even, there are 
some that God cannot do, because he is too 
good ; in other words, because they are not 
right or best. This, then, limits him, first 
physically, or rather, in producing all the things 
that are physically possible. For all the bad 
things, the painful, etc., are defended him by 
his nature, or by his attributes, taken as a 
whole; for, according to them, he must seek 
what is good. He is limited again, morally, by 
the attributes themselves in their limiting of 



122 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

each other. That is, he cannot go the full 
stretch of mercy because of justice, and vice 
versa. For all that is possible in the way of 
imparting justice — that is, giving to each ac- 
cording to his merits — is not possible, if God 
will do all that is according to mercy ; and so 
he can do nothing else than compromise, and act 
according to the greatest good. Now, this fact 
of the limitation of his powers by his character, 
accounts for important phenomena in the world. 
We may ask, Why does God inflict pain on men 
in some cases where it is not necessary, accord- 
ing to the natural laws, as in sending plagues, 
or in providing a hell for the wicked ? We 
may suppose, in case it is God that does any of 
this, that it is because of the impossibility of his 
moral attributes working at full freedom ; that 
his mercy cannot be fully exercised by reason 
of justice, or there would not be a place of pun- 
ishment after death ; that there would not be 
scourges of wars, famines, etc. We shall show 
hereafter that it is probably not God that is the 
author of these things, but that where they do 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 123 

not result from the necessaiy laws they are 
produced by men, or other free beings, who, 
from their freedom, may be bad ; and that it is 
unavoidable by God. But we mention this rea- 
son for those who think that it is not impossible 
that God could physically prevent it. For the 
fact is, that we do not see him limited physically, 
but it seems to us that he could as easily abolish 
hell or a volcano as he could destroy this world, 
or have produced it, neither of which seems 
impossible. 

We say, then, that there are certain moral ne- 
cessities that limit the course of God ; that if he 
wishes to have all things orderly, according to 
a few simple laws, which, as far as we can see, 
is good, it will be impossible for him not to 
crush willingly, sometimes, a child in a hail- 
storm, or destroy the crops of the good, or 
overwhelm a city or country w T ith fire or water 
or disease. We say that it is possible that God 
should see these things and be able to pre- 
vent them, and yet not prevent them ; not 
because he would not wish to do it, (as he 



124 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

would, according to that higher state of things, 
which is only conceivable, and not possible,) 
but because it is impossible to do so and keep 
on with his general laws, or go according to 
order; and this order may be worth more — 
that is, on the whole, may be better, than 
to avoid these exceptional injuries; that is, 
it may be the best possible state of things, 
though the best conceivable state is where the 
order could go on, (if it were possible,) and yet 
not produce these results. Thus we can attrib- 
ute to God many, even of those things that are 
evil, even when he could help it ; but this does 
not imply that it was part of his ultimate ob- 
ject, or that it is all perfectly good ; but that he 
did it unavoidably. We can say, indeed, that 
it is all for the best — that is, that his course 
of action under which this resulted was for the 
best ; but we cannot say that there is any good 
further end in that special evil — that is, that it 
is the means of good, and not rather a necessary 
evil result consequent on other means that had 
it not in consideration. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 125 

We may say here that we know not how 
many such evils may be necessary — such as that 
God should condemn all men to death — that he 
should make a hell for us — or that he should 
make some suffer who never deserved it ; that 
the only way to prevent this was to sacrifice his 
Son ; and that then, even, the wicked could not 
but suffer eternally. The only way to know this 
is to learn it from some authority, should there 
be such ; for we cannot reason out whether this 
or that or the other thing is here a possibility ; 
and it may be that the only way to acquaint 
us with this is by sending us a revelation, and 
that the only way that it is possible for us to avail 
ourselves of the good possibilities left is to be- 
lieve, etc., as we are taught in the Bible. We 
cannot, in the light of these possibilities — for we 
see that there is the possibility that all this may 
be so— esteem lightly the claims of the Christian 
religion, or pronounce hastily against any of the 
things taught in the Bible, however they seem 
unworthy of God. 

We say, then, that by the character of God, 



126 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

— that is, by his different attributes — as well as 
by the necessary laws, there are certain things 
imposed on him, according to which he must 
go. This we may call perfection necessity. 
God, then, is bound by natural necessity and 
by perfection necessity, both limiting the things 
that are possible. When, therefore, we enumer- 
ate the possibilities or species for him, we must 
include these two sources of limitation. 

Of course we cannot search out, even ap- 
proximately, these possibilities and impossibili- 
ties, the moral any more than the physical ; but 
we are certain of the fact of their existing, 
more or less extensively. We have, it is true, 
certain moral axioms, just as we have natural 
axioms — as that it is not just that a man should 
suffer for what he could not help, and that a 
perfect being would not willfully inflict pain 
(unless for some further good). And we might, 
indeed, from these few axioms, construct a 
moral geometry, and trace out a system of this 
kind of possibilities, just as we can those of 
space and of number in natural geometry and 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 127 

arithmetic. This will give us not only some- 
thing of the character of God, or a perfect 
being, hut will enable us, within certain limits, 
to trace out what God did, and what he did not, 
as certainly as we can trace out this or that con- 
clusion from the geometrical or logical axioms. 
We shall do some of this in Part Third. 

We may add here, that there is a further 
analogy between the perfection necessities and 
the natural necessities ; that just as many things 
must result from the necessary laws when God 
does a thing, besides what he does (in the strict- 
est sense), so this moral necessity gives rise to 
many laws according to which God must act ; 
so that when he has once started in a course, 
.his way is, to a great extent, determined further. 
That is, if he attempt to create a man, the 
moral necessities will carry him, without any 
further special determinations, to create him so 
as to be as happy as possible, as guiltless as 
possible, in as good circumstances as possible, 
etc. They require him (for he lives according 
to them) to observe this and that thing, by 



128 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

which the best will result in each case. We 
say that the moral necessary laws require this 
of his character, and that, therefore, they deter- 
mine his course in many cases without any new 
exercise of purpose, so to speak ; so that the 
subsequent volitions which he takes are deter- 
mined (as what ought to be) by the first one 
that he takes — just as the making of a valley 
results according to the natural necessity when 
God makes a hill, even without his designing 
the valley. Thus, subsequent purposes of God 
unfold according to the moral necessity, just as 
subsequent facts unfold according to natural 
necessity. 



far* Gfrirfr. 



APPLICATIONS TO THEOLOGICAL 
QUESTIONS. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF SIN, EVIL, FOREKNOWLEDGE, ETC. 

After what we have seen, we can easily see 
how sin, evil, etc., may be accounted for 
without attributing them to God. We have 
seen that there are certain undesirable things 
unavoidable in case God, or man either, should 
do certain other things that are not undesir- 
able, or that are the best even. So that, should 
we attribute the evil in the world to God, we 
need not say that he has designed it, or that it 
is in accordance with his will. But we have 
seen, also, that it is not necessary to attribute 
every thing either to the necessary laws, or to 
God, or to both working together; but that 

there are other agents, as men, who have 

9 



130 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

original power. To these, therefore, we can 
attribute some of the disorders, without sup- 
posing that God either wished them, or did 
them, or rendered them necessary. We speak 
here principally of those involving sin, which, 
at least, we are certain a perfect being could 
not produce. 

We can say, then, that men may be the 
authors of sin, wholly and ultimately. Ob- 
serve, that when we say men, we do not say 
that there may not be in other worlds other 
beings like men who have this power, and who 
may have more or less influence even on this 
world, just as men have influence on each 
other, and on succeeding generations. Such 
other beings there may be, as angels, a devil, 
or beasts even, who can commit evil in the 
same way as men. We speak, however, only 
of this world, and in as far as we know it, 
when we say that men are the authors of sin. 
To admit such other agencies will not destroy 
our principle any more than to suppose the 
number of men to be increased. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 131 

With this explanation, we can clear God of 
the charge of being the author of sin, and can 
establish a theodicy. 

To this it may be objected, in the first place, 
that God rendered it possible for man to sin. 
Yet that possibility was left in the nature of 
things, or among the species, by the necessary 
laws ; so that what disadvantages there are to 
man from the probabilities that he will sin, 
must be attributed to them, and not to God, 
they being such that if man is created free, 
there must be such possibility. The only thing 
that can be charged to God is, the making of 
man a free agent when there was this proba- 
bility. 'No w God, in making the choice of 
making a free agent of man, or not, had only 
to choose between the best thing possible and 
the possibilities that were not best, the pos- 
sibility which was the best being also deter- 
mined by the necessary laws as a species. 
That God did not do the best that was possible, 
we have, d priori, no evidence whatever ; and 
as to judging from a study of the actual state 



132 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

of things, we cannot conceive of how things 
could, on the whole, be better. 

God could, indeed, have chosen the other 
alternative, and made man altogether subject 
to his laws, so that he would perform his 
functions, like a tree or river, without any 
original power. But we do not know, in the 
first place, that it would be possible for beings 
to be made so as to have life and enjoy them- 
selves, who should not have this original power ; 
for we know not but that the beasts, birds, etc., 
even to the smallest insect, may have the power, 
in a degree, as also the power of abusing it ; 
for we have no evidence that the lower orders, 
any more than men, are always doing what is 
best, or the best that they can ; but when a 
mule is given to kicking, it may be that it is 
acting beneath its privileges. Again, no one 
will think that it would be better for all things 
to be right, and no life or enjoyment, than 
that there should be creatures made to enjoy 
themselves, with the danger of doing wrong. 
Or if it be thought that it would have been 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 133 

better had we been made capable of enjoyment, 
of creation, etc., in a lower degree, so that we 
would not be required to make such important 
errors, we can say that we do not know that 
our happiness would be more, or our misfor- 
tunes less, or just what state it is where there 
is the greatest sum total of happiness, or the 
least of misery. All that we can say here is only 
conjecture, without any manner of certainty 
that things could be better; whereas we know 
positively that there are some impossibilities 
that must limit God in the good that is possible 
for him. 

There are, then, no valid proofs going to 
show that it is not the best state of things that 
God has adopted in making man free as he 
did, and so no charge on him for the sin that 
there is. 

It is sometimes objected that God must have 
foreknown that men would do wrong, and that, 
therefore, he is chargeable somehow with their 
sins. As this question is of great philosophical 
and theological importance, we shall treat it 



134 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

more fully than is necessary to settle it here; 
for there are a great many side questions that 
are taken in connection with it, and on which 
the general opinions of men repose ; so that 
they, as well as the real matter, must be ex- 
plained in accordance with our system. 

In the first place, it seems to some that to fore- 
know implies to do, or, at least, to necessitate 
that it shall be done, whence it is inferred that 
God must have so determined things, in order 
that his knowledge could not err. But to fore- 
know, in itself, does not imply to do, even 
though it is known with a certainty that the 
thing will come about; for God knows, and 
we also, that the necessary laws will hold at 
any future time; that the three angles of a 
triangle, for example, will equal two right 
angles. Yet he did not produce those laws, 
or bring it about that they shall hold in the 
future, or past, or any time. So we can say of 
the necessary laws, at least, that foreknowledge 
concerning them does not imply any fore- 
determination. So we may say, even that if 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 135 

the things that exist are all necessary (the 
same as the necessary laws), it does not follow 
that God has determined them, as some have 
supposed ; but it follows rather that they exist 
without him, just as the necessary laws do. 
So that the fatalists, least of all, ought to claim 
that God is the author of all things. Yet we 
find that the predestinarians are generally of 
the class that believe that things could . not 
have been otherwise than they are, and yet that 
God is the author of them. Those things that 
must be need have no author; in fact, are in- 
capable of any. Much less is there reason to 
believe that they are foreknown, or can be fore- 
known, only because they were made. In fact 
they, existing always, cannot be foreknown at 
all. The most that can be known is, to know 
beforehand what will be the results that will 
be developed, that is, what form the forces that 
are now existing will take at a future time. 
But that is not to cause those results, or future 
forms ; because the forces already existing that 
shall bring them about are antecedent to our 



136 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

knowledge and to us, and so not tlie result of 
our working, (or of God, as the case may be.) 
Any thing that is necessary, therefore, cannot be 
considered as being produced by any body, even 
by God, and nobody can be charged with it. 

But it may be thought that those things that 
are not necessary, that is, that have a cause, 
cannot be foreknown without their being fore- 
fixed to come about ; so that those things that 
we do, or that God does along the course of 
events, must, in case they be foreknown, have 
been foredetermined. Now, here we must dis- 
tinguish again. There is a kind of knowledge 
that persons can have of future things that yet 
does not imply that the things be fore-deter- 
mined, that is, probable knowledge. So there 
may be a knowledge with God when he makes 
men, that it is probable that they will sin, 
which does not require determination. 

Again, it is not certain at all that God fore- 
knows every thing, at least with any thing 
more than a probable knowledge. There is no 
reason for believing that he should foreknow 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 137 

any thing except the necessary laws, and the 
effects that would result from them, in con- 
nection with his works established up to that 
time ; so that if we have any reason to believe 
that there are things originated or created from 
time to time, as we have seen to be certain, we 
can say that, if the fact of these creations by 
men, and the special providence of God, requires 
that they should not be foreknown, which 
seems to be the case, God does not foreknow 
them. What reasons are there for the fore- 
knowledge of God that philosophers and theo- 
logians should cling to the belief so tena- 
ciously ? 

It has been thought that it detracts from the 
perfection of God if he is not omniscient, and 
that he cannot be omniscient without knowing 
the future ; but we have already seen that God 
cannot do every thing. Is it any worse to sup- 
pose that he cannot know every thing ? ¥e 
have seen that he cannot make a triangle with 
two lines or a free being who cannot sin. We 
must recognize all along that there are some 



138 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

things that are not possible for God, or we will 
get ourselves into greater difficulties. 

Furthermore, those persons that say that God 
eould not foreknow any thing without foredoing 
it, limit his powers or his knowledge as much 
as we. They hold to the doctrine of predesti- 
nation because of flniteness in God's knowl- 
edge ; that is, because he cannot, as they 
conceive, foreknow contingent events — events 
(should there be such) which have been 
produced by free beings ; that is, originated 
without their being forefixed at all. If they 
really believed in the omnipotence and omnis- 
cience of God they would not say that this is 
impossible, and that, therefore, his foreknowl- 
edge must be accounted for otherwise. Besides, 
if it were impossible for God to foreknow free 
actions, as they think, would it be more in ac- 
cordance with a perfect being not to allow any 
such to be done than to allow them to be with- 
out his knowing them? They make God to 
contract his plans because of anticipated igno- 
rance on his part. That, it seems to us, is not 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 139 

a sufficient reason why there should be no free 
actions allowed. But yet they cannot give up 
that God does foreknow. But, in fact, that is 
no foreknowledge at all which foreknows only 
what God does at the time. He knows only 
the present, and what the fixing of the laws, by 
which the future results will be brought about, 
insures ; he knows nothing more than the ma- 
chinery that is in his hands at the time. It is 
as if I throw a stick in a river, and know that 
it will be farther down the stream in half an 
hour. Suppose that I know all the laws at 
work, so that I could calculate exactly at what 
place the stick will be ; in knowing, then, 
where the stick will be half an hour hence, I 
have no foreknowledge, but only a knowledge 
of present forces, etc., which will bring about a 
future result It is just like calculating for the 
almanac at what time the sun will go down on 
a particular day of the year, or when there will 
be an eclipse, God has no foreknowledge if he 
has no other than this. The only difference in 
his knowing where the sun, say, will be at a 



140 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

given time, what eclipses there will be, etc., 
and ours, is, that he, having established the 
laws, knows that they will continue, while with 
us it is at most only a probability founded on 
induction. But aside from this greater degree 
of certainty on his part, his foreknowledge dif- 
fers in no respect from ours. Those, then, that 
hold that God can only know what things he 
does, or fixes so that they cannot turn out other- 
wise, hold that he cannot foreknow at all, and 
therein are no different from us if we say that 
he does not foreknow, except that they say 
there is nothing else than what he has prede- 
termined. They acknowledge his inability for 
certain things, and say that those things, there- 
fore, do not exist. We acknowledge those 
things, and say that, therefore, he does not 
foreknow them. They find it necessary to deny 
certain facts, because, if such facts should exist, 
God could not know them, and thus make his 
foreknowledge, or the perfection of his knowl- 
edge, to consist in denying the existence of all 
the things that he cannot know. We allow 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 141 

that these things do exist, and think it no more 
discredit to him not to know them existing, 
than not to be able to know them in case they 
did exist ; for we can at least conceive them, 
and the opponents must acknowledge that we 
can conceive of some things that God cannot 
do. There is, therefore, no reason in urging so 
strongly that God foreknows all things, much 
less that he does all things. 

We may say further, that those who hold 
that he foreknows all things, and that in order 
to do this he must have predestined all things, 
and so be the cause of them, and that, therefore, 
he is the cause of the evil in the world, as well 
as of the sins of the individuals, and the cause 
that some are lost — that such persons sacrifice 
some of the attributes of God in order to de- 
fend others. They sacrifice his goodness, jus- 
tice, etc., to defend his knowledge; and even 
sacrifice, as we have seen, all real foreknowl- 
edge to preserve the fact that he knows all 
things, or that he has done all things. Allow- 
ing, then, that according to them, God is all- 



142 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

knowing, and the author of all things, he is in 
no other respect a God such as we conceive he 
ought to be. For a perfect being could not 
produce the sins, miseries, etc, which we see, 
at least not willingly. Yet such persons gen- 
erally claim not only that God does all things, 
but that he could do any thing whatever, and 
that all that is in the world is exactly for his 
glory, etc. They do not even make the dis- 
tinction that it is the best that is possible, 
though not altogether such as would be desira- 
ble, for it would be acknowledging some impo- 
tence in God to suppose him unable to do the 
absolutely good. We get, at most, a very im- 
perfect God if we attribute all these things to 
him — sin, devils, hell, and all sorts of miseries 
lasting eternally ; for the predestinarians gen- 
erally believe all this, and that, too, all for his 
pleasure, being inflicted without any regard to 
the merits of the persons receiving it, except in 
as far as lie has made them to merit it. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 143 



CHAPTEE II. 

THE SAME CONTINUED — FUTUKE PUNISHMENT— 
AN EVIL BEING — ABOUT LEGITIMATE THEO- 
KIZING- IN SUCH MATTERS. 

We choose, instead of this, to attribute evil to 
men, or beings other than God. This we are 
permitted to do because, as we have seen, there 
are other agents in the world who have original 
or creative power besides God. This we are 
required to do because of the perfection necessi- 
ty of God, and further, because our experience, 
as far as we question it, is direct evidence to it, 
and also comports with this idea wherein we 
cannot follow out the cause of evil (in some 
special or supernatural cases). In this way we 
can account not only for the evil on the earth, 
but in hell, or any where where our faith or rea- 
son calls us to believe there is any. For it is 
just as likely that there should be elsewhere 
free beings who can sin, as here ; and just as 



144 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

likely that there will be as great effects, pro- 
portionally, for evil ; so that if superior beings, 
like angels or devils, can sin, having a greater 
power to produce things, they can produce evils 
proportionally greater than those that we are 
acquainted with here. Hence there is nothing 
revolting to reason in the idea of hell ; that is, 
a place of evil ; or of a devil or devils ; that is, 
beings of evil. Because we see there is here 
the same thing on a smaller scale. All that is 
revolting, is to say that God is the author of it ; 
but it is equally revolting, to say that he is the 
author of that which we see here actually to be 
existing. People will do well, then, who are 
called on to defend the existence of the devil, 
hell, etc., to claim that it is not God that pro- 
duced them, but other beings that have the 
power of creation, which we have seen to be 
the case ; for after what we have seen, it must 
be admitted that God has not all power in the 
universe ; and since we cannot assume that 
every thing is as he would like to have it, but 
know the contrary to be the fact, it may be 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 145 

that there are some very great evils, as well as 
some very little ones, which he cannot prevent. 
With any other view we do not see that there 
can be any justification of sin, hell, Satan, etc. 
With this view there can be no charge brought 
against God for any of these things. To ac- 
count for things that*we actuallv know to be 
facts, we must suppose agencies or principles 
that will allow us to admit of these also. When, 
therefore, any of the terrible teachings of relig- 
ion are repelled by the claim that a perfectly 
good God would not make his creatures to suf- 
fer, etc., we can say that it is not God that does 
it. If it be said that God would not permit it 
and that, therefore, it cannot be true, it may be 
answered that God cannot help it. If it be 
claimed that he has all things under his control, 
etc., we can say that such is not the fact. If 
God will not allow such things as hell, etc., 
why does he allow such things as the miseries 
on earth ? ■ If he cannot help it on earth, what 
evidence have we that he can help it in hell ? 

We might add, moreover, that we do not 
10 



146 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

know that hell is a much worse place than the 
earth is in many parts, or that it is not subject to 
improvement, just as by progress here men can 
get the world into a better condition. We 
state this merely to show that there are certain 
ways of things conceivable, which, in case they 
be true, will take away1;he objection to many 
things that are revealed, or that for other rea- 
sons we are inclined to believe. And we may 
add further on this point, that as long as there 
is a way that we can conceive a thing to be, 
even if there is no positive proof that it is that 
way, rather than any other way, then there 
can be no objection brought against the belief 
of that thing, even though it be generally con- 
ceived under another idea, an idea repugnant 
and altogether unreasonable, it may be. Thus 
it is especially with some such things as hell, 
which are generally pictured so as to revolt the 
reason, though the fact of a place of punish- 
ment may be conceived under circumstances 
that, if not altogether satisfactory, are at least 
analogous to what we have here. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 147 

And we may say here in general, that all 
this crying against theory or supposition is very 
weak, because when a thing is revealed to us 
that seems unreasonable, there is no other way 
of trying whether it be correct than by making 
all the suppositions or theories that are possible, 
to see if there is any condition in which it can 
be imagined or conceived where it is reason- 
able, that is, consonant with our other knowl- 
edge. If there is no such, we can conclude 
that the whole thing must be rejected ; if there 
are such, we see in that the possibility of its 
being true, though we may not know with 
equal certainty that it is true just as we imagine 
it ; especially is this the case if we conceive of 
two or three ways of how the thing may be ; 
but while the fact of there being a number of 
ways possible increases the probabilities that it 
is true, the probabilities of it being any par- 
ticular way are diminished. If, however, there 
is but one way conceivable that a thing can 
be, there is full evidence that the thing is that 
way, if it is at all, even though we have no 



148 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

evidence of its being that way, but only of the 
fact of its being. This distinction we must 
make, then, in theories, and not pronounce all 
alike improbable or unsupported by evidence, 
even though they be nothing but theories. But 
when there is one of this last kind, it carries 
with it all the force of demonstration; and the 
mere fact that we can make a theory as to how 
a thing may be, takes away the objection to 
that thing on the ground of impossibility. So 
if it is told us that there is a hell, and it is 
objected to the fact of there being a hell that 
it is too horrible, etc., for a good God to allow, 
the objection will hold if there is no way that 
we can conceive of hell being without being thus 
horrible, etc. But if we can make two theories 
or suppositions, one of how it may be without 
being too horrible, as that it is a place of 
punishment not much worse than this world, 
and capable of improvement, even though it be 
everlasting for the persons that go there; and 
if we can conceive again that it is not God that 
has made it, and that he could not prevent it, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 149 

(and this supposition was altogether in analogy 
with the things that we find here,) the objec- 
tion to hell no longer holds. But the fact of 
there being two theories possible, according to 
which it may be, renders it more uncertain that 
it is one way or another. Which is the more 
probable of the two possible ways must be de- 
termined, in as far as it can be determined, by 
examining which more nearly corresponds with 
the other things that we know to be the state 
of facts in as far as known. It may be, too, 
that the thing is according to the two theories, 
or that each one embraces part of the way that 
the facts are. 

We think we can safely say, then, that it is 
not God that is the author of hell, etc., any 
more than of sin ; but that sin has brought it 
on, or that beings have done it by their sinning, 
either directly or indirectly. For we have seen 
that there are a great many things that are 
brought about by other beings than God, and 
that such must be all the evil. But when we 
say that it is not the work of God, we do not 



150 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

mean that he has had nothing to do with it. 
It may be that he has interfered by his provi- 
dence, as we shall show hereafter, by which he 
has made the evil to be less than it would 
otherwise have been. It may be that men or 
angels, or the like, have only sinned, or brought 
about some evil, when it has been necessary 
that there should follow punishment, and that 
God has produced the hell or modified it, as 
the least possible evil that could result, that is, 
regulated, so to speak, the results of evil, so 
that it should follow uniformly for the punish- 
ment of sin, warding it off the good. God 
may, then, have made hell, but not originally, 
that is, without being compelled to it by some- 
thing else that has been done by other originat- 
ing creators. Then he may have done it in 
order to attain thereby the greatest good— not 
the greatest good that was possible in the first 
place, but the greatest that was left. Of course, 
this is not a matter that we know about; but, 
as far as we can see to object, we can see to 
explain how it may be without objection. So, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 151 

in fact, we can say of all the evils in the world. 
It may be that God has had a hand in them ; 
but yet he cannot be considered as the author 
of them, but only as coming to rescue man from 
receiving the full result of sin, or as turning evil 
into good — making it into the best good that is 
left, though we cannot say in any case that the 
good is as great as if the evil had not been ; 
and we ought to guard against maintaining that 
God has brought certain evils on us in order to 
correct us, or perfect us, or that sin is a good 
in the world. God, we say, does no doubt 
come in to " turn it to good," as the best that 
can be done; but yet the final result is, no 
doubt, worse than if the sin had not been com 
mitted. He does, indeed, do things to chastise 
us, but that chastisement is brought on by our 
evil, and would itself be an evil if there were 
not the sin that we did. But our sin would, 
without it, be a greater evil, so that it cannot 
be considered as a good absolutely, but only as 
a less evil meant to correct a greater, and make 
the sum less. Such interferences on the part of 



152 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

God in the evils we can allow, and so consider 
him as the author (remedial) of some things 
that we see are undesirable in the world. We 
can, perhaps, in this way attribute to him some 
storms, some conflagrations, some deaths, as, for 
example, when he would prevent a victory to 
the wicked, or pride in a nation or city. When, 
therefore, we attribute all the evil in the world 
to other beings than God, we do not disallow 
that there may be some such agency of God in 
them. But we should always see that the evils 
remount ultimately to some other cause, as 
man. God may be the cause of some things 
which man has made him to cause. That is, 
man may have done badly, and so compelled 
God to do something else, in order to avert as 
much of the evil as is possible to be averted. 
Thus man is the creation-cause of the evil in 
the first place, and the reason-cause of what 
God does of it. With this limitation, then, 
we can say that man is the author of all the 
evil in the world. Observe, too, that we do not 
say that what God does is not an evil, even 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 153 

though he does it to prevent a greater evil. 
A flea, which God sends for a chastisement, is 
an evil just as much as one that man brings by 
his dirtiness. It is, however, a good relatively, 
just as medicine is an evil, but a good, because 
of the disease ; and it is not the same cause that 
has produced the disease that has caused the 
medicine to be taken. Thus, as the medicine 
is an evil for the taste, and a good for the 
stomach ; so a plague of fleas may be an evil 
to the good men of the place, and in so far 
absolutely evil, and be a chastisement for the 
others, and a good relatively to the crimes, and 
so a good on the whole. We know not how 
God maneuvers all his interferences, but we 
easily see the principle on which he must pro- 
duce evil, if he produces any in the world. We 
shall speak more fully of this in speaking of 
the providence of God. 



154 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 



CHAPTER III. 

PROVIDENCE. 

When" we once admit the principle that there 
are other forces at work besides necessity and 
the laws, we can easily understand what provi- 
dence is. It is nothing more than one of the 
creative forces at work that we have spoken of. 
We have seen that the forces existing in things 
are, 1. Necessity ; 2. God ; 3. Man. Provi- 
dence, of course, comes under the second head. 
The works of God we can consider as of two 
classes : first, those that he effected long ago, as 
the world, the laws, and other things which we 
commonly consider as permanent ; and secondly, 
the special acts which he from time to time puts 
forth to meet emergencies, as it were. It is this 
last of the works of God that we call provi- 
dence. These two are, however, essentially the 
same. Both are creations; that is, the produc- 
tion of things without any previous cause, as 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 155 

we explained before. Providence, then, is a 
continuation of creation, where God continues 
to exert his originating power, or to produce 
things ; as man does by means of the freedom of 
the will. 

There is in this nothing remarkable or im- 
probable. We have no reason to suppose that 
God did every thing that he does when he first 
created the world. He did not do all that was 
possible ; that is, did not determine all the spe- 
cies or possibilities into facts, as we have seen. 
Furthermore, as he has made other beings, as 
men, to produce other things than what he has 
himself created, there is reason to suppose that 
God did not do all the things in creation that 
he wished to be done. Again, since men, as 
we have seen, have done many things wrong, 
so that bad results are in the world, there is 
further reason why God should continue his 
work, if for no other purpose, at least to coun- 
teract the evil, or to gain for men the opportu- 
nities of securing the greatest good after the 
evil that they have done. And not only in re- 



156 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

spect to evil, but in other cases, it is evident 
that since there were left many things undeter- 
mined, which afterward have been determined 
by men (or other creative creatures) in a way 
that was not foreseen by God, that is, not 
known at the time of his general creation, at 
least not determined then, it is evident, we say, 
that if God should do any thing more, and if 
his doing should depend on what men do, he 
must do it after men determine what they shall 
do, and, therefore, after the works of men. 
Now men have been working at all times, and 
will work, so that we may expect the work of 
providence to continue always in order to sup- 
plement the works of men ; or rather, to supple- 
ment his own works, after other creatures, whom 
he has allowed to work, have done their part. 
For example, it was not determined, perhaps, 
before 1492 that America should then be dis- 
covered, or before the battle of Waterloo or 
Torktown what would be the fate of Europe or 
America, or in any other case, depending on 
men's wills, just how the thing would be after 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 157 

men should act ; so that if God meant to do 
any thing to harmonize with the result he 
would have to wait till after that time. He 
must, then, come with his supplemental acts of 
creation, that is, with his providence, in 1776, 
if he will do any thing for the declaration of 
independence, or the establishment of the Re- 
public, or the regulating of our constitution, 
etc. Nothing is more unlikely than that he 
could meet such cases by the general laws that 
he should establish at the time of creating the 
world. Nor is it reasonable to suppose that 
God would not do any thing special in all these 
cases, but leave the world to chance, after he 
had loosed creative beings in it who should 
produce things that he had not calculated on, 
and who, moreover, have no such general view 
as to know what ought to be done to preserve 
the whole good, but work only within narrow 
range, and toward short-sighted ends. It might 
be answered, perhaps, that God has made gen- 
eral laws to guide the great events, and that 
within smaller limits it makes little difference 



158 Principles of a System of Philosophy. m 

how men act. But though it might make little 
difference to the general state of things it would 
make great difference to men. Our power over 
the happiness of the race is so great, and the 
general bearing of our actions so little under- 
stood, that we should have much fear for the 
lot of the race if we did not believe that our 
destiny was superintended by a providence al 
ways at the time and place. 

In view of this, we say it is not incredible 
that God should be keeping on with his work, 
so that if we are called upon to believe it by 
revelation we need not mistrust it by reason. 
We have, perhaps, no experimental evidence 
that it is so. There is, however, this proof, 
namely, that it harmonizes with the general 
system which we have herein set forth, nearly 
all the other parts of which system we have 
substantiated by experience or by axiomatic 
certainty, (in pure thought.) But neither is 
there any evidence from experience that it is 
not so. It may be asked, what is it that God 
does in his providence, since we see nothing but 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 159 

what is the result of his laws, or of men's work- 
ing ? We answer that he may do what men 
are doing, or works similar, or what the laws 
are doing, or works similar. 

It may seem a drawback to science to sup- 
pose that God is doing things in the world, so 
that we will not attribute things to natural 
causes, but often rest short in our inquiries, and 
say that God has done it, and that there is 
hence a presumption that God has now left the 
world to men and the natural laws, as a proper 
study for men, not wishing to confuse by inter- 
ference. In answer to this we may say that 
men are all the time creating new things, and 
why not God % Men's works do not disturb 
science, but are counted in as an agency whose 
results are always in accordance with the nat- 
ural laws, even though they determine things 
in nowise necessary. And it is not necessary 
that God, in order to create, must set aside any 
of his laws, or interfere in their natural results. 
On the sea-shore the works of the Creator, as 
well as the footprints of man, may be found 



160 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

without interfering with the inquiries of the 
geologist. Birds, beasts, worms, and men are 
all the time at work, each, putting forth orig- 
inal force; and in science we are accustomed to 
acknowledge this, and by making allowance for 
these as causes, experience no confusion in our 
inquiries. So, too, the laws in their effects on 
in animated matter we do not understand mi- 
nutely, as in the sea, the air, etc., so that we 
cannot tell just what currents exactly they 
would take if left without any interference of 
creative beings ; so that in this margin of in- 
definiteness in our knowledge we may allow 
other forces, and yet not see the difference. In 
short, it does not seem necessary that God, in 
order to work still in the world, need interfere 
with the inquiries of man, these inquiries never 
going far enough, or minute enough to distin- 
guish the fine lines on which God works. We 
look at the gross, and the gross, as far as the 
laws are concerned wherein we comprehend 
them, will always be the same as if there were 
nothing but the laws and men at work. We 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 161 

have not yet learned what it is to create, 
whether by man or God. When we learn that, 
we may, perhaps, be able to distinguish the 
things that God has done in his providence. 

There is a converse conclusion that we ought 
to guard here, namely, that we cannot expect 
to see, in a scientific knowledge of things, the 
providence of God working, so that we can 
take it into the account in the phenomena or in 
our calculations, at least definitely. 

Besides, the evil that might result to science 
from there being a providence, or from its 
being recognized, would be offset by the good 
that would result from a greater confidence in 
nature, so that in the more practical science, as 
hygiene, the customs, etc., we can follow our 
adaptations without fear ; and furthermore, in 
our individual actions we can follow the right 
with a confidence that it will be for the best, 
which is important, since, aside from our con- 
science, we often cannot tell which is best. Our 
conscience, it is true, does not tell us this— in fact, 

throws no light on nature ; but yet it so rarely 
11 



1 62 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

errs in reaching the best, if we follow it, that 
we can easily conceive that He who is keeper 
of the conscience superintends also the rewards 
of it. It would be hard for us to suppose that 
we should gain the good from following con- 
science, since it is liable to err, unless there 
were a providence that managed the results. 
We say this not positively, but only to show 
that if we must believe the things that are gen- 
erally believed about the conscience we must 
account for it in this way. 

It cannot be alleged against the fact of there 
being a Providence that there are many evils 
still in the world. We have seen how these 
sometimes cannot be prevented even by God, 
and cannot be altogether gotten rid of when 
once done, it not being among the possibilities ; 
so we can no more allege it against providence 
that they are not prevented, or not wholly coun- 
teracted, than we can charge it against God (in 
his creation or laws) that they were done in the 
first place. Furthermore, we may admit a 
providence, even if there are some evils that 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 163 

we cannot see but could have been prevented 
or overruled ; for we know not all the things 
that are impossible to be prevented. Again, it 
does not follow, even if there is a providence, 
that he should prevent all the evils that are 
possible to be prevented, for there is, as we 
have seen, a perfection necessity by which he 
must do only what is best, and it may not be 
best that every evil left curable by natural ne- 
cessity should engage his interposition, for it 
might only bring on a greater evil, as by de- 
stroying the simplicity of his order, it being the 
least possible evil now. Yet we may still have 
confidence that in his providence God is doing 
every thing that is for the best. The world, all 
as it is, is reconcilable with the idea of a provi- 
dence. 

Again, we ought not to expect miracles nec- 
essarily if we maintain that there is a provi- 
dence. All that is required of God, in order to 
fill up the full measure of a providence, is to 
produce things that do not result of themselves 
from his laws, or the like. Now he can do that 



164 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

without there being a miracle, for men are 
doing it all the time. Furthermore, it is likely 
that though God creates in his providence, yet 
the things that he has created before, as well as 
the necessary laws, help him, that is, conspire 
to bring out the result, just as at any time that 
which he does is partly produced by that which 
existed before. 

From the foregoing we may draw an infer- 
ence that God, though he works in his provi- 
dence, makes use for that purpose of the laws 
already existing, and of the facts already ex- 
isting, so that not only we cannot see per- 
haps any thing but what may appear to be 
the result of the existing laws and facts, but 
also it will be a fact that the work of God is 
not all creation, or all something new, but 
much of it he did not do with his providence. 
So we may add here that if in any past time, as 
according to the New Testament accounts, God 
has seen fit to produce things more wonderful 
than ordinary, it is not necessary that he should 
turn aside any of his laws ; but it may be that 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 1 65 

even to produce these phenomena he made use 
of the laws already existing, so that they did as 
much as they do when we make wine or bread 
in the natural way. We can conceive that God 
could create wine at once as easily as he does 
any thing else in his providence, for it would 
only be a creation, as he and we are doing all 
the time ; for if we can produce something from 
nothing, that is, originate it absolutely, why 
not wine as well as a volition ? Still we see 
that even for the production of all the phenom- 
ena of his miracles it is not necessary that he 
do not make use of the laws, that is, the means 
that are natural, and make the wine out of the 
water, acid, etc., already existing, only hiding 
for his purpose some of the process ; for it is 
already so far out of the power of men to pro- 
duce it any way in so short a time, that it is 
miracle enough to produce it w T ith ever so little 
creative force. 

But though we ought not to expect miracles 
in the sense of something extraordinary, yet we 
should expect in the providence of God mira- 



1 66 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

cles in all their reality, that is, that he is actu- 
ally creating things that before did not exist, 
and creating them to meet the special wants 
that arise. Yet we need not disbelieve in mir- 
acles, if we should have evidence of any, or rea- 
son for any, as in the Scripture accounts ; for 
there is nothing that we can see in the nature 
of things that would forbid God's producing 
them. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 167 



CHAPTEE IV. 

PRAYER. 

From the foregoing we can see how it may not 
be useless to pray. For if God is still working 
in things, there is no objection to prayer from 
the supposition that all is fixed and goes by 
law, or that there is no more power to be exer- 
cised. The only other objection commonly 
urged is, that God, being all-wise, will do what 
is best, so that our prayers cannot change him. 
This, however, goes on the supposition that 
there is in every case only one thing that is 
best, and that, therefore, God is limited to that. 
But there is no reason against supposing that 
there are cases where there are various things 
possible, each of which is equally good, so that 
God will do the best by following either one or 
another. It does not seem to us necessarily 
the best that the world have been made just 
where it is in space, rather than at a place 



1 68 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

a little different, or that it be just of its pres- 
ent size any more than of any other size ; 
that there be five continents rather than four ; 
that there be just the metals there are; that 
there be a certain number of trees, a certain 
quantity of water, of clouds, of wind, etc. We 
say that we have no reason to suppose that 
there are not many possibilities where it mat- 
ters not whether one be chosen or another, or 
cases, perhaps, where there may be a thousand 
alternatives equally good. Not only is there 
no such reason a priori, but in our experience 
there is none ; but, as far as we can see, it 
makes no difference whether the state line of 
Virginia be where it now is or a mile farther 
south, whether I put on my coat or my boots 
first, whether I plant one grain of corn or an- 
other, whether I walk slow or fast, etc., so that 
if we can draw any analogy to the possibilities 
beyond our comprehension, there is reason to 
believe that the good or best may be often in- 
differently one or another alternative ; and yet 
it is on the positive assumption that there is 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 169 

only one way that is best, that this objection to 
the efficacy of praying is founded. 

And not only so, but we have reason to be- 
lieve that our wanting one thing more than an- 
other will make that to be the best even if they 
were equally good before^ seeing that our hap- 
piness, etc., depend on it ; for this may be a 
consideration that enters into what constitutes 
a thing the best. And not only so, but it may 
be that our desire sometimes makes a thing to 
be best, when another was before the best, that 
is, that our desire can change " the best ;" so 
that there is every reason why God should fol- 
low our desire. Nor can it be said that he 
makes our desires, and has taken them into the 
account when he fixed his course ; for as we 
are in many cases the authors of things, we are 
in not a few the authors of our desires, at least 
remotely, for they often arise from steps that 
we have taken. It is, for example, because we 
have planted corn that we desire rain, because 
we have undertaken a study or voyage that we 
desire certain things in that direction, etc., and 



170 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

the choice of planting or of study may be, as we 
have seen, of our own (original) determination. 
The next question is, whether God does not 
know our desires, etc., so that he will work 
accordingly without our asking. To this we 
may answer, first, that our desires are often 
created in our prayers, and would not exist 
without our praying. For example, we often 
go to praying knowing only indefinitely what 
we want, and when concentrating our mind to 
express it, see more clearly and separate th& 
real object of our desire from a great many 
other things that before we included in a vague 
way ; and it may be that in some cases we even 
change our opinion in our prayers, and wish for 
different things altogether. And not only in 
our desires, but in other respects, we may change 
our condition by praying, as by getting ourselves 
into a better state, which will also cause "the 
best " to change. This is acknowledged by some 
theologians, though they go no further than to 
think that this good reflex on us is the only re- 
sult of our prayer, without having any on God, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 171 

or bringing any on us from God. But if it can 
make us better, or in any way change us, will 
it not also make God change his course in re- 
gard to us, and so change his course absolutely 
from what it would otherwise have been ? Nor 
can it be said that this is no real change in God, 
since he only by necessity, as by machinery, be- 
stows the good on us according as we get our- 
selves into one state or another, just as if we put 
ourselves in the line of the sun's rays the sun- 
shine will fall on us without there being any 
change in the sun. This might seem to follow, 
since God must always do the best. But observe 
that God is working along by special act, and 
not by law merely ; and to bring these changes 
about, which must be now since men have thus 
acted, but which would not have been needed if 
they had acted differently, and since men have 
determined of themselves to act this way— to 
bring these about, we say, so as to suit each 
case, requires an act which, to be determined, 
must depend on our action, and so wait for it. 
Again, in some cases, as we have seen, a state 

/ 



172 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

of things will be produced in which one or 
another way equally will be the best, so that 
God, to act by his providence, must make a 
choice as to the one or the other, and not mere- 
ly be determined (otherwise) by the best. And 
this state of things (that is, where several are 
the best) being just brought about at the time, 
God must make up his mind at the time so to 
speak, so that he must wait on our prayers, and 
not only be determined by them, but make up 
his mind specially in the case. So it must 
seem, any way we can look at it, that we gain 
the attention of Deity, and can change him in 
his providence, and so effect something by our 
praying. 

It might seem that all this could be brought 
about without our praying; that by studying 
on our desires, for example, we could get them 
defined equally well, and that so God could 
answer them, they changing the best, etc., all 
the same ; and that the other effects which our 
praying has in changing our condition could 
be secured in some other way. There are, no 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 173 

doubt, effects that could be secured, and some 
of these same effects, by studying and the like ; 
as we do secure some of them at any rate, 
whether we pray or not ; and other effects still 
might be secured from doing what we should 
do in the time now given to praying, and some, 
too, which would result from that other state of 
mind that we would experience in case we did 
not indulge in any such thing as praying, (the 
skeptic's state, for example.) Yet besides the 
fact that we are called on by God to pray, as 
most of us believe, there is also some power 
that seems to us especially good, and that must 
have a better effect, perhaps, than any other we 
can conceive of, in knowing that we are talking 
before God, as he looks into our faces, so to 
speak — that is, that we are doing something in 
the matter, or that our wishes, etc., and our 
attention and his are all on the subject together, 
which constitutes a*kind of communing or in- 
terpassing of natures. What the effect on us 
from God would be in this we do not know ; 
but in the indefiniteness in which we conceive 



174 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

of it, it must ever seem good. And we are 
taught that God helps us or meets us in our 
praying, so that we feel his influence, etc. All 
of which is so natural to think, or so in accord- 
ance with our experience, that there cannot, 
from our pure thought or any other knowledge, 
come the least doubt on what is taught in Scrip- 
ture concerning prayer. 

It may seem, perhaps, that the great God is 
not such as to be so easily moved or changed by 
such little things ; but we may answer, first, that 
in nothing can we conceive his greatness to con- 
sist more than in bis being ready to attend to 
all these little wants, they being infinite when 
we consider the multitude of creatures that are 
praying or wishing to him — and not only in 
hearing, but in working according to these 
wants. For it seems that that expresses great- 
ness more than to be immovable, either in at- 
tention or work, so as to sit 4 motionless, learning 
nothing and doing nothing. 

But if any of these things, as waiting on us 
to learn and to act,* seems to be detracting from 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 175 

his infinite perfectness, we must remember tliat 
he is already limited, so that there are some 
things that he cannot do and some that he 
cannot know. It is nothing to add these few 
more, seeing that there is the necessity for it. 
The unwillingness of men heretofore to acknowl- 
edge that Grod did not know every thing, and 
could not do every thing, has prevented them 
from arriving at any consistent science of him ; 
whereas here all these things follow from the 
things that are universally admitted, as the prop- 
ositions in geometry follow from the axioms. 

But though we can move God by our prayers, 
yet it is only within the range of his provi- 
dence. There are some cases, then, where we 
cannot expect him to answer our prayers. 
These cases may be inferred from what we have 
already seen. 

1. In the first place, our prayers will not be 
answered if we pray for any of the things that 
are impossible ; for it is evident that his provi- 
dence is not doing any thing there. There are 
a great many things that become impossible at 



176 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

different times as the work of God (and of men) 
proceeds ; but we speak now only of the im- 
possibilities inclosed by the necessary laws, 
for these are for the most part more clearly 
recognized. It would be of no avail to pray 
God to make a triangle out of two straight 
lines, or a square with five angles, or a circle 
whose circumference could be touched in more 
than two points by a straight line. There is, 
perhaps, no danger of our praying ordinarily 
for such things ; yet it might be thought some- 
times that God ought to work a miracle to con- 
vince us or the world, and so we might feel 
ourselves justified in praying for it, when we 
might not distinguish and pray that it be in this 
shape. There are some miracles, indeed, that 
could no doubt be done, and they would serve 
the purpose just as well. For example, God 
could make it thunder in a particular way, or 
could make wine out of water, or raise a man 
to life, or something of that kind. But these 
others are impossible even for him, so that we 
should not pray for them, nor believe them done 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 177 

even if they are alleged. And we may observe 
here that the miracles of Scripture are none of 
this kind, and that in making objections to the 
credibility of miracles we should make this 
distinction ; for while it seems that these, how- 
ever well attested, must be false, so that no evi- 
dence can prove them, it is not so with the 
others ; for though we may have never met the 
like in our experience, and so they be improb- 
able, yet we have no evidence that they are im- 
possible, or that there might not be occasions 
where they should be done. 

But though there is little danger of men 
praying for any such impossibilities — that is, 
for those that we discover in geometry and 
logic — yet there are others equally impossible 
from the necessary laws, that we are apt to pray 
for. We ask God, for example, to make us 
good, keep us always from erring, etc., when we 
are all the time doing something that is not 
good, and mean to continue in it; that is, we 
pray that he may make us good, and at the 

same time leave us to do the bad. 
12 



178 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

If, then, we would not pray for impossibili- 
ties, we must study those that already exist, and 
guard against making any ourselves. 

2. In the next place, our prayers will amount 
to nothing if we pray against the laws and facts 
w T hich have already been established. It is 
useless to pray that the law of gravitation be 
suspended, or the law of cohesion, or the law 
of the workings of the mind, or for any par- 
ticular facts that will require their suspension, 
as that we may walk without opposition where 
a house is in the way, that we may go through 
a river without getting wet, through fire with- 
out getting burned, that we may run water up 
a hill, walk fifty miles without getting tired, 
drink poison without injury, etc. We are not, 
perhaps, in danger of praying for things so 
palpably against nature ; but we pray that we 
may become rich when we are doing nothing 
for it ; that we may succeed in a task when we 
are not working at it, or not working well; 
that we may become learned when we are not 
studying, or great when we are not doing great 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 1 79 

things, or healthy when we are not living ac- 
cording to the laws of health. Thus we are 
apt often to pray for results without causes, or 
for results different from the natural effects of 
the causes, which also is more or less contrary to 
the laws. If we pray for wealth, and expect 
it because we are good, it is the same as to 
pray for oats when we have sowed wheat. 
Here, however, we must be careful. We do 
not say that we will not receive some effects 
without putting forth the work that is to cause 
them ; for all that God does, that is, all that 
we get from Providence at all, is of this kind, 
that is, he is the cause. But we here speak of 
a degree rather than a kind of presumption. 
For while it may be that God will produce by 
his own creation some things without our put- 
ting forth the cause for them, or while we are 
working for other results ; yet it is reasonable, 
d priori, and evident from experience, that he 
will do this only to a limited extent, so that we 
ought not too much presume on it, at least for 
a luxurious abundance in that direction, as we 



1 80 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

may have if we work for it by the natural 
means; so that, as we have said, we have no 
reason to expect that by our praying alone we 
will become rich men, even if we are good, nor 
learned men, as we might be if we also worked 
for riches and learning. 

3. In the next place, our praying will amount 
to nothing if we pray for what is not good. 
We have seen, however, that sometimes we can 
make a thing best by our wishing and our 
praying, which would otherwise be indifferent, 
or even not best. We do not include such 
cases here when we speak of that which is not 
good ; for evidently, though there be such, yet 
not all things can become good by our wishing 
them or asking for them. Again, there are 
some cases where we do not know whether a 
thing is best, and so must pray at a venture. 
Yet there are many things that we know very 
clearly not to be good, and when we say that 
we ought not to pray for what is not best, we 
mean, of course, these, they being the only 
class that we can make any practical use of, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 181 

though the principle is equally true of the others. 
If we pray that God will inflict pain on any- 
body, send destructive rain, retard the march 
of progress, or the like, there will, no doubt, be 
no effect. We naturally shrink from praying 
for such things ; and if we mean to do wicked- 
ness, do it ourselves, without trying to get God 
to do it ; and our feeling is not to have God 
know it, and generally to dismiss all thought 
of him in connection with it, so that if we think 
of lying or cheating, or entering into a con- 
spiracy, we are not apt to call God to help us, 
or to call upon him at all, unless it be for par- 
don ; so that we are in little danger of praying 
for that which we believe not to be good. Yet 
we do this in an indirect way when we follow 
our desires or prejudices, even with a protest 
of conscience, it may be, and seek to get what 
we want without inquiring whether it is good 
or not, when a little inquiry, perhaps, would 
make us see that it is wrong. Thus men take 
up the cause of their country in a time of war, 
or of their sect, or family, or friends, when 



1 82 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

there is opposition. So, two persons, whose in- 
terest cross, try each that he may have the 
advantage and may pray God to help him, 
when he has not considered which would be 
best, and fears to make an inquiry. 

4. In the next place, God will not be apt to 
answer our prayers if we ask him for what we 
can do ourselves ; for he meant us to do some 
things, having apportioned the supplemental 
w r ork of creation between his providence and 
men. Men, therefore, are a kind of providence 
that sees to carrying on things on a small scale. 
We see, accordingly, that there are things 
within the power of men. Now, nothing is 
more natural than that men should do these, 
and that if they do not, they will suffer the bad 
consequences, they being left undone, as also 
w T e experience to be the fact. We ought, then, 
not only not neglect any of these things, but 
ought not to ask God to do them, even though 
we work faithfully at them, for it is unmean- 
ing prayer. We ought, then, to discountenance 
that kind of praying which asks God to help 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 183 

us to made a saddle, or a quill pen, or a brick 
wall, or to purchase a suit of clothes. We have 
no reason to believe that because God works in 
his providence he interferes in all our affairs 
indiscriminately, but only in those cases where 
man cannot do the work, or cannot do it alone, 
for there are enough such ; for, while it is true 
that there are a great many things that men can 
do, (originally and wholly,) there are others in 
which they can engage which they cannot carry 
through wholly, as in conducting governments, 
great railroad and navigation schemes, wars, 
civilization, and the like. For, with all that men 
can do, they cannot comprehend the whole work, 
and cannot know at every step what means will 
best bring about the ultimate result. Here, as 
it is reasonable that God should help them, it is 
natural that they should pray to God to do some- 
thing. So we cannot say, without limitation, that 
we should not call God to help us in our work ; 
but when we engage in what we believe to be also 
his work we can pray with confidence. For it is 
not supposable that there should be a clear line 



184 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

of distinction between what man can do and 
what not, and so between the work of God 
and that of man. But in many cases the lines 
are distinct, and we should at least consider 
and not call God to engage in a work unworthy 
of him ; or, at least, we should be sparing of our 
prayers in such cases, so as to save what time we 
have for praying, for where it will likely avail 
something, or avail more. If we reckon our 
prayers of any value, we should look at them as 
a means of power that ought not to be carelessly 
expended. If it be asked whether we should 
not ask God to help us in all that we do, be- 
cause in nothing are we absolutely certain of 
our strength, we may answer, that though we 
may make such general prayers sometimes, yet 
we ought to use the same good sense in praying 
that we do in other things, and see when it is 
more l%kely that we would be helped ; for though 
there is always more or less doubt, there are 
cases where it is comparatively small. 

But though we should not pray for those 
things that we cau do ourselves, we do not 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 185 

mean that we should not pray for any of that 
class of things. One man cannot do all that 
men can do. There are many things equally in 
his power before he commences to work, but he 
must select ; and so, when he chooses some, the 
others become for him impossible. And so 
with the race of men: they can engage in one 
lot of things only to leave others that are 
equally possible for them undone. Accord- 
ingly, there may be many very trifling things 
even that we can pray for successfully, but the 
circumstances render them impossibilities for 
us. We have no reason to suppose that God 
meant all the things that are easy enough for 
man to do to be done by him. When man has 
done all he can, he may with reason pray to 
God for help, whatever it may be that is wanting 
yet. But we see no reason to pray for God's 
help while we are working beneath our strength. 
5. In the next place it amounts to nothing to 
pray for those things that will be any how. To 
ask God that the necessary laws may always 
exist would be as ineffectual as to pray that 



1 86 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

they be changed. To ask God to do good, that 
he will be just, or that he will be merciful, is 
equally useless. So it seems also useless to ask 
him to do what is best for us, or any of those 
things that his perfection necessity requires ; so 
too to ask him that his laws may be always the 
same, that spring, summer, etc., may come. 
Since we do not always know, we must, per- 
haps, often pray for what will come about at 
any rate, just as we must do sometimes for 
those that God will not do notwithstanding our 
praying, in both of which cases our prayers are 
equally useless. But there are many cases 
where we can make the distinction. 

There is a sort of submissive persons who 
look around, before they dare think of praying, 
for those things that will likely come about, 
and then ask designedly for them, thinking 
that they can make acceptable prayers only by 
exercising resignation to what is. We should 
rather study for what will not come about, and 
pray for that if we want it. It is true, we 
should calculate so as not to fail, and hence 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 187 

should not pray for the things that we have 
excluded in the foregoing paragraphs ; but we 
should not seek to avoid failure by attempting 
no contingency. We see no reason why fatal- 
ists shou]d pray, or any that believe that what 
comes about is predestined, nor why we should 
pray that God will act according to his will. 

Outside the strictures above made we have 
no reason to suppose that at any time we can- 
not move God by prayer, and since in many of 
the cases we do not know what is not possible, 
not best, etc., we should venture freely in pray- 
ing, yet always with that sort of resignation 
that if our prayers are not answered we should 
not doubt of God's answering prayer, seeing 
that there are nearly always probabilities more 
or less that one of the above causes for failure 
exists. We should study our wants closely, 
and not be afraid to develop our wishes on a 
subject, or to enter heartily into calculations 
on what we are about to get by praying ; and 
then with the impressment that the probability 
that we are right, and the belief we have in 



1 88 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

God. warrant, pray in fervency proportioned to 
the value of the thing and the difficulty of get- 
ting it, that is, in proportion as it is beyond 
our abilities or the natural causes that are in 
operation to bring it about. We should not let 
go easily a thing that we undertake by prayer 
any more than one we undertake by study or 
by manual work ; for it is not all at God's dis- 
posal whether he will answer or not, but in 
some cases, at least, as where we can make it 
the best — as by our longing and w T orking for it — 
we have a hold on him, so that it is we that 
determine him to give us help. 



APPLICATION TO THE INFINITE, THE 
IDEAL, THE QUESTION OF PROGRESS, 
AND LIKE MATTERS. 



CHAPTER I. 

OF A PEEFEOT BEING OR ATTRIBUTE. 

In all questions of progress we must be limited 
by the consideration of what is possible ; in all 
questions of radicalism by the consideration of 
what is necessary ; so as not to attempt an im- 
possibility, nor to undo a necessity. Our ideals 
as well as our efforts should be thus limited, 
and our thinking kept within the range of the 
possible; so that we shall not have wishes that 
cannot be realized, nor thoughts that have no 
correspondent realities. Our ideal of a man, or 
of a state of society, or of heaven even, should 
have upon it at least the same restrictions as 
our idea of a perfect being. "We have seen that 



190 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

God is not all that we can think to be most 
perfect ; for we have seen that we can think of 
some things that are impossible, as, for example, 
of a being that could draw a straight line so as 
to cut a circle in more than two points, or that 
could make free beings and yet render sin im- 
possible, and it may be that we shall think that 
a being having such power would be more 
perfect. 

Before proceeding with this matter we shall 
treat of ideals, or that which we conceive to be 
the most perfect, whether in a being or state of 
things ; and first, to commence with God. 

We have said that we can think of a being 
more perfect than he, at least as having more 
power, more knowledge, (or foreknowledge, at 
least,) more justice, more mercy, etc. When, how- 
ever, we say that we can think of such a being 
we do not say that we can conceive of such ; 
that is, we can have some impression or thought 
in our mind in regard to it, but we cannot have 
any conception of how such a being can exist ; 
but we perceive directly, on the other hand, that 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 191 

such a thing is impossible. That which we 
have shown God to be is the most perfect that 
can be, and consequently God fills up the full 
measure of perfection. We have seen, how- 
ever, that there are limits in nature (or in ne- 
cessity rather) to perfection, or to what a per- 
fect being can be. Even if there are certain 
other qualities thinkable they are not possible 
to be gotten into a being. A being cannot 
exist, or be conceived to exist, so as to fill up 
the full measure of perfection. This, however, 
needs explanation. A quality might be more 
perfect than it can be in a being, just as a piece of 
leather can be greater than it can be in a shoe. 
Justice or power, as we conceive it, is a more 
perfect thing than it is as it can exist even in 
God. We have seen that God must be limited 
in his justice, since he must have mercy in 
order to be a more perfect being ; yet in con- 
ceiving of perfect justice we do not conceive of 
any such limitation, but think of justice as un- 
limited. Yet such justice cannot, as far as we 
can see, be gotten into a being, at least in a per- 



192 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

feet being, as it would suppose cruelty, or at 
least something less desirable than when it is 
limited by mercy as an accompanying quality. 
It is the necessary laws that make this impossi- 
bility. So it is with power. We have seen 
that God cannot have unlimited power ; but 
yet we can think of unlimited power, that is, of 
a power that has nothing impossible for it, or 
where there is absolutely nothing that it can- 
not do. Yet such a quality cannot be gotten 
into a being, indeed cannot exist at all, seeing 
that the necessary laws will not allow of such. 
So we may say, in the iirst place, that not all 
the qualities that can exist — as power, justice, 
mercy, foreknowledge, etc. — can be gotten into 
a being, much less a perfect being, in all the 
stretch which constitutes their unlimitedness. 
We need not think it wonderful, then, that men 
have some power that God has not, as, for exam- 
ple, their wills, to sin, etc. ; whether we consider 
it that it is impossible for him to have it, or that 
he morally cannot have it, which is the same 
thing, it being an impossibility. So the ideal 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 193 

of an all-perfect being, that is. the type or spe- 
cies, does not embrace the qualities in their 
unlimited extent, so that it is not necessary 
that such a being be all-powerful, all-just, all- 
merciful, all-knowing, etc. ; but the qualities 
must be cut down to fit in with each other into 
the whole— all this, however, be it observed, be- 
cause the necessary laws require it. In the 
next place, we may say that there are some of 
the qualities (thinkable) that are not possible 
at all, that is, that have no existence in nature, 
even as species or possibilities, much less in any 
real being, as, for example, all powerfulness ; 
for it is not possible that there should be a 
powe* that could do some things, as make a 
triangle with two straight lines. All these 
must be excepted to omnipotence. In other 
words, there is no such thing as omnipotence 
possible, or else it must be meant by omnipo- 
tence to be able to do only all the things 
that the necessary laws leave possible. But it 
may be asked whether we have not a clear and 

distinct conception of omnipotence, or of a 
13 



! 



194 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

power that has no limit. As Descartes says, 
we look upon ourselves and see that we are 
weak, doubtful — in short, imperfect — and that 
we have a conception of a being that is not so, 
that is, of a being without impotence, without 
ignorance, without imperfection — at least a con- 
ception of these qualities. We might answer 
here, perhaps, that we have no such conception, 
but that we perceive these to be really impossi- 
ble. But before making full answer to this we 
will examine several other things in Descartes. 
When he says that every thing that we can 
clearly and distinctly conceive is true, we can 
accept it if he mean thereby the species, as we 
explained before, and to which meaning we 
brought the " ideas " of Plato before we could 
admit their truth. But even then it would be 
true as a species or possibility, not as a fact — 
that is, not as a possibility determined into a 
real existence. We can clearly and distinctly 
conceive a circle, and know that it is possible 
from the necessary laws, that is, that it is a spe- 
cies with certain properties, (or with properties 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 195 

in the necessary laws ;) and so a triangle, a right 
angle triangle, a horse, man, nation, virtue, etc. 
We should rather say, however, we may add 
here, that in these cases we can clearly and dis- 
tinctly perceive, or intuit, that there are such 
things, that is, such possibilities, such laws, etc. 
¥e do not conceive, that is, comprehend them 
as certain clear things, so much as we see the 
fact of them. But beyond this we know not 
that there is any truth in the saying that what- 
ever we can clearly and distinctly conceive is 
true, nor do we, except in this sense, conceive 
a triangle, a circle, virtue, etc., as we showed in 
treating of the ideas of Plato. My idea of a 
circle is clear and distinct, yet in that clearness 
itself I do not see any evidence of its existence ; 
but it may be of the same clearness as when I 
think of a horse with wings. But additionally 
to the clearness, there is an impression that it 
is true, or a real intuition that the thing is true — 
that is, as a possibility. And here we may ob- 
serve of such ideas as horse, man, etc., that we 
only know them to be possible, (that is, know 



196 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

them to be species,) because we see the individ- 
uals, (whence, of course— from seeing the fact — 
we can infer the possibility of it.) But we have 
otherwise no conception of any such species, 
any more than of a flying horse, by which we 
conceive it as possible or impossible. It is only 
the simple things that we thus conceive. 

Now, Descartes has no reason to say that 
omnipotence, omniscience, a perfect being, etc., 
are clearly and distinctly conceived in this sense. 
For, as we have seen, omnipotence in its widest 
sense is impossible — and so, too, the others— 
that is, is not among the species even ; much 
less is it perceived to be among them, or the 
fact perceived of a being that possesses them. 
We can say, then, that Descartes' God is not, 
as he claims, clearly and distinctly conceived, 
and that he is not even possible ; and also, that 
the qualities which he put in him are not con- 
ceivable, or possible. We do not, be it observed, 
deny that part of Descartes' method by which 
he claims that God may be searched out, de- 
fined, etc., as really as any thing in geometry ; 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 197 

but we admit, as it will follow from what we 
have seen already, that the qualities of God, 
that is, of a perfect being, may to some extent 
be traced as really as those of a circle, of a 
triangle, of matter, etc. But we only oppose 
the God that he has found out, that is, the 
attributes, and the method too, except in as far 
as he acknowledged the fact that he could be 
so defined. We have seen that God is not 
omnipotent, omniscient, etc. ; and that certain 
other attributes which the world have always 
allowed him, and Descartes among the rest, 
do not belong to him ; and the method which 
we should pursue to find him out, or rather, 
what he may possibly be, (for the truth of these 
possibilities being facts or existences must be 
proven otherwise, as by design, the power in 
nature, etc. ; for we have seen that not all 
things that are possible are facts,) the method, 
we say, is to examine the things that are pos- 
sible, and of which we have such strong, pure 
intuitions, as well as the intuitions of "the 
perfect." We have found God to be limited 



198 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

in various ways, both in his power and in his 
mode of operation, whereby we can account for 
the evils in the world and the facts of our 
experience without running against his charac- 
ter ; for that has been the difficulty heretofore 
with the philosophers, that the God which they 
imagined was always offset by the facts that 
they otherwise knew. 

But what shall we say of Descartes' quali- 
ties, as all-powerful, all-knowing, etc., which he 
claims to have clearly and distinctly conceived 
in contrast with himself, or the ego which he 
found to doubt, to be imperfect, etc. ? Of such 
ideas we can say no more than that they are 
factured by the mind, and not perceived by it. 
The limit of power is what he actually saw, 
that is, the imperfection in himself; and the 
perfection, or opposite, or negative of that qual- 
ity, is only an inference that we can easily con- 
ceive could be made from experience ; for we 
have seen that there is white and not- white, 
great and not-great, etc., and this opposite or 
privative may be put after any thing whatever, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 199 

hence limited and not-limited. But that does 
not say that there is such not-limited. And 
here we may answer at the same time those on 
the other side, who claim that all our ideas, or 
species — or our knowledge of the absolute or gen- 
eral — are thus made up without any objective 
reality. We can allow, with them, that all such 
ideas or terms may be gotten by experience, 
and may add, too, that if we have nothing else 
besides the terms or the distinction, there is 
no evidence of objective reality. But we claim 
that we have outside of terms, an intuition of 
the truth, which does not change with the term 
or any distinction that we can make. Thus it 
may be that the word " infinite " we get from 
negativing the idea of finite ; but in addition to 
the word, we see directly that space is infinite, 
that the properties of a triangle or circle hold 
infinitely, (or universally,) etc. ; so that, though 
the word infinite may be only the opposite of 
finite, and universal of particular or some, yet 
the things that we know to be infinite are not 
thus learned, and hence are not word-knowledge 



200 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

merely, but are seen by an intuition of the 
fact. 

Now Descartes, it seems to us, (as also Male- 
branche, Spinoza, and all that have followed 
this method,) has gotten his properties of God 
merely by this negativing, and without any per- 
ception of the thing in nature ; which rendered 
it easy for the Transcendentalists, chiefly Kant 
and Hegel, to show that those qualities were 
only subjective, and that he had no evidence of 
their external existence. A perfect being, he 
said, must be all-knowing, without doubt, with- 
out wishes, (he being self-sufficient,) having all 
power, all virtue, be immovable, etc. In fact, 
all was given him that a perfect being required, 
and there his God stood wanting only exist- 
ence. To give him this he supposes that the 
character of a perfect being implies existence ; 
that is, that that is one of his qualities, and 
hence that he must be existing as well as om- 
nipotent and omniscient. Now we can see, as 
we have said, how all these qualities were 
formed out of terms, and from qualities that 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 20 1 

we have in our imperfect state. And besides 
them, we have no intuition that there is a being 
having these qualities, or any one of them, or that 
any of these qualities, as omnipotence, omnis- 
cience, etc., exist. On the other hand, we have 
seen that some of them are impossible, and that 
as to the others, it is impossible for them to be 
wrought into any one being. About all the 
intuition or perception there is in Descartes' 
conception is this, that these qualities must be 
in a perfect being if they are possible, or in as 
far as they are possible. The difficulty with 
him, as with Leibnitz, and all the theologians 
who have written on this point, is, that they have 
not recognized the necessary laws as existing. 
And we may say that those who discard alto- 
gether what these men attempted to prove 
make a greater error ; for though the necessary 
laws require that God cannot be omnipotent, 
yet there may be a God as great as they do 
allow, so that when persons argue that there is 
no God or he would have made things better, 
have prevented sin, etc., and that, therefore, all 



202 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

the conclusions, and the method, too, of defin- 
ing God adopted by the Church and philoso- 
phers, is without ground — we say that when 
they claim this, they only take advantage of 
an error of Descartes to reject his conclusion, 
though they do not touch the great matter at, 
bottom. 

But now, instead of there being merely a con- 
ception of perfect, of all-powerful, all-knowing, 
etc., which shall be the opposite of imperfect, 
weak, doubting, etc., — instead of our resting 
content with this, we look right into nature it- 
self — into the necessary laws — and see with the 
force of an axiom that there are certain things 
possible and certain others impossible; and with- 
in these limits we can construct a god, which 
shall be no less a god of our own making, ex- 
cept that we shall see that it is a possible god, 
and therein unlike Descartes', for he did not 
take into consideration whether he was possi- 
ble ; but we have seen that his is not such. 
Furthermore, we may see, too, that there must 
be some god, (in order to account for some of 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 203 

the things that actually exist,) and that he must 
have some perfections, and some other qualities, 
as definite as any that we learn of the triangle 
or circle, and that if, moreover, we can see 
that in any particular respect there is only one 
possible way that he can be so as to embrace 
the qualities that are required to be admitted in 
him, in order to account for the things that we 
actually know, we can infer that that is God, 
that is, that he fills that measure of the possi- 
bilities, or that species, which is left in the nec- 
essary laws. Thus we say that we can get a 
knowledge of God, not perhaps of all his quali- 
ties, but at least of some — of some that are posi- 
tive as well as of the limitations that prescribe 
what he cannot be. So that whereas men have 
heretofore sought God by showing how unlimited 
he is, and could never get him great enough in 
their thoughts, we would approach him by the 
opposite method, and by taking off this and that 
as not belonging to him, and limiting and still 
limiting, get him at last within limits that we 
•can comprehend him in what he is. We ap- 



■204 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

proach him really by two ways — in following 
the necessary laws to see what he cannot be, 
and then in following the positive facts in the 
world to see w T hat he must be. Bringing to- 
gether what is impossible and what is necessary, 
we can see, from what the one requires and 
what the other allows, what the fact is. 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 205 



CHAPTEE II. 

OF AN IDEAL THING, OB CONDITION THINGS. 

Gun ideal, therefore, must be limited. When, 
however, we say that God cannot do just any 
thing whatever, know any thing whatever, etc., 
we do not say that he is not perfect ; for he is, 
as we have seen, as perfect as any thing can be, 
and we should rather change our idea of per- 
fection than our opinion of the character of 
God as to perfectness. 

Now what we have said in regard to a per- 
fect being will apply to a perfect finite being, 
or perfect condition of things ; a perfect man, 
for example, or beast ; a perfect or ideal reaper, 
shoe, banquet, government, etc. ; that is, our 
ideals, first of the thing, (as a whole,) and then 
of the qualities, should be according to the pos- 
sibilities, and the possibilities, too, in their con- 
nections in which the things are to be found. 
There is still, however, a difference between God 



206 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

and other things in this respect. For the pos- 
sibilities that inclose his existence are few, and 
determined only by the necessary laws ; whereas 
the others, as of a state of things in the world, 
a man, or a machine, are determined also by 
the laws that God has made, and the facts that 
have been thereafter produced. A sewing ma- 
chine, for example, must have the properties of 
wood, iron, thread, etc., in it. The human 
form, the fashions, the cloth — in short, the na- 
ture of the wants — go in to determine its possi- 
bilities. The ideal, then, must lie within all 
these. So for the individual character, (of a 
man,) the ideal must be limited by all that 
which constitutes human nature, as the size 
of a man, the two legs, heart, etc. Now the 
qualities, as justice, knowledge, mercy, beauty, 
and the like, whether in men or in things, 
will have other limitations than in an infinite 
being, much more than those same qualities 
as we conceive them abstractly ; that is, just 
as the ideal thing must accommodate itself to 
the possibilities, so the ideal qualities must 



Principles of a System of Philosophy, 207 

accommodate themselves to the possibilities 
of the qualities existing in the things, (con- 
crete.) Beauty may be something in general, 
(a species,) yet that beauty can no more be 
gotten into a man or a reaping machine, than 
all possible existences (species) can be gotten 
into it. Beauty, as it can be gotten into a 
human being, is very much shorn of its quality 
as a species or possibility, much more as it can 
be gotten into any special kind of person, as, 
for example, a large man with a little nose and 
a little mouth ; for there would be in this case 
a greater distance between the nose and the 
mouth than would be consistent with the beauty 
of a person, (the greatest possible,) which sup- 
poses also a beautiful lip. As the many things 
that have been done up to now, limit very much 
the things that are possible yet to be done, so 
that we cannot hope to bring about just any 
state whatever, the present impossibilities being 
required to be left out of the account of all cal- 
culations on future possibilities, and also there 
being other impossibilities made as we proceed, 



208 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

which also must be subtracted ; the qualities, 
as of beauty, affection, etc., changing with these 
changes, so that they will not be possible in the 
same way as if there were not these specifica- 
tions, must be limited as a fact, just as any con- 
ceivable state of things must be limited in order 
that it be at all possible as a state of things. 
The ideal, in order to follow the fact, or the 
possibilities rather, must trim down its beauty 
to each different condition. The ideal is the 
ideal for the possible, and beyond this we 
should admit none, seeing that there is no spe- 
cies in which it can be realized. Our not re- 
garding this accounts for why our ideals are so 
far from the real, and why there are no perfect 
ideals (concrete) of men. If we should follow 
our ideal through all the possibilities, or should 
consider beauty in the changes that it takes 
with the changes of condition that the state 
of mankind presents, it would, no doubt, al- 
ways be found perfect in the individual ; for 
we do not know but that every individual has 
the greatest beauty that his given parts allow 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 209 

of, and in imagining our ideals we generally 
give as many, perhaps, as any individual actu- 
ally existing possesses, (of those limiting his 
beauty.) For we do not know that beauty is 
any thing more than what results necessarily 
from the relation of the different things deter- 
mined into facts, and so a thing following 
necessary laws, and never failed of in any 
being when we consider the things that that 
being for one reason or another is required to 
have. One reason, perhaps, why we are not 
still more frequently disappointed in our ideals 
is, that we practically draw them most com- 
monly from examples of beauty, (as actual 
facts,) and so idealize forms that are possible, 
and love that kind of beauty which is possible 
with them. It is not this kind of ideals that 
we are disappointed in so much as those that 
we make altogether a priori, for we do some- 
times, with the abstract idea of a state, a man, a 
triangle, etc., compare the individuals, and con- 
clude that the ideal is not found in them, but 

that all is deflected. In making such ideal we 
14 



210 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

do not generally consider the possibilities and 
impossibilities, and the facts which are deter- 
mined in the world, and which, consequently, 
are working as forces to produce certain forms 
(particular,) instead of the general which w T ould 
result from the necessary laws alone — in case 
they only were working — and which produce a 
beauty to correspond with these forms. For 
we may add here that even a circle or triangle 
that is drawn by a man takes not the ideal 
form (that is, is not a real circle or triangle) 
that is inclosed by the necessary laws alone, 
but follows in its beauty, regularity — perfection, 
in short — the determined facts that it meets with 
in its being formed, and the beauty that is pos- 
sible in association with them. 

Points being given, there is a possible beau- 
ty, etc., and that beauty should be the ideal. 
Certain things are given in the creation, in the 
past history of men, etc. The ideal of the per- 
fectibility of man is to be found in the things 
that are possible yet. Of course we, not know- 
ing this in full, will not have this for our ideal, 



Principles of a System of Philosophy. 211 

so that we may make another ideal that shall 
serve us ; but we err in as far as we map other- 
wise than according to the possibilities, and are 
prudent in as far as we make ourselves certain 
of our ideal only to the extent of our knowledge 
of the possibilities. The rest, being uncertain, 
should not enter into the ideal of a special state, 
at least not definitely. 



APPENDIX. 



SEVERAL TABLES AND APHORISMS FOR THE 

FURTHER EXPLAINING OR ELABORATION 

OF THE FOREGOING. 



Appendix. 



215 



TABLES 



I. AS FOKCES. 



NECESSITY. 

A Concurrent Force only, r- 



God. 



Man, etc. 
See VI or VIII. 



General Facts as Matter, ' Providence. 

Laws, etc. 

II. AS LEARNED. 



IMPOSSIBILITY. 



POSSIBILITY = CON- 
TINGENT. 



A priori only, 1. A priori (as 1. From the two 

and thence deduct- the opposite of ne- inferred, though 
ively. Geometry, cessity.) with only induct- 

Arithmetic, Logic, 2. A posteriori, ive certainty ; for 

etc. as the opposite of we only see what 

contingencies is not forbidden 

known to he facts, by impossibility 

as, for example, nor included in 

the impossibility necessity; but not 

of things being as knowing all of 

if a certain fact these we do not 

had not been ere- know whether the 

ated. things may be pos» 

sible or impossible 
by further require- 
ments of the nec- 

essary laws. 

2. Inductively, 

as seeing the fact, 

(with deductive or 
absolute certain- 
ty,) for that which 

# is cannot be 

among the impos? 
,. sibilities. 



216 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 



m. AS CHANGING. 



NECESSITY. 



POSSIBILITY. 



IMPOSSIBILITY. 



The original al- Some of the The original 

ways the same, original possibili- possibilities not 
though when a ties become neces- changed, but oth- 
possibility is once sities, and others ers- added: when 
determined, (to impossibilities, as a possibility is 
fact,) it renders any are deter- once determined 
certain other mined into fact. its opposite be- 

things that were comes an impossi- 

before contingent ";'" bility, even though 

now necessary ; it was equally pos- 

just as certain .•:•••• sible before. If, 

others are ren- however, the op- 

dered impossible. posite had been 

determined into 

fact, then would 

the present fact 
*•••» ««••«•••• become the im- 
possibility. 



Appendix. 



217 



IV. AS EXISTENCES. 



NECESSITY. 

1. Nothing ex- 
cept the necessary 
laws. 



2. Things that 
must be. 



POSSIBILITY. 

1. Any thing 
whatever except 
as limited by the 
necessary laws. 

2. Things that 
maybe. (Species.) 



IMPOSSIBILITY. 

1. Things for- 
bidden by the nec- 
essary laws. 



2. Things that 
cannot be. 



3. Uncreated. 3. Created when 3. Uncreated, 

existing. The except that new 

facts are all in this impossibilities 

class, and,are pro- come after any 

duced by the work creation, just as 

of creation and the new necessities 

necessary laws. (but never new 

possibilities, 

though that may 

become possible 

on a further crea- 
tion, which was 

..... » not yet possible 

from the things 

already existing, 

that is, which was 

. not yet ready to 

be made fact.) 



2 1 8 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 



V. POSSIBILITIES. 



Determined, Undetermined, 

that is, that is, 

Facts. Possibilities, not Facts. 



VI. THINGS (in their relation to final Causes.) 

Designed Undesigned 

by God by Men, etc. Necessity. Eesultants 

< K x / * s from creation 

World, Laws, etc. Houses, States, etc. and necessity, 

and subse- 
quent laws 

• and facts. 

(Some evils, 

unimportant 

things, etc.) 



Vn. THINGS (in their relation to first Causes.) 



UNCREATED. 



Necessity, Possibilities, and World, Laws, Houses, 

Impossibilities, with all their etc. 

changes while creation is go- 
ing on. 



Appendix. 



219 



VHI RESPONSIBILITIES. 



World, 
etc. 



Laws, 



Houses, Charac- 
ters, etc. 



ON NOBODY. 

Certain alterna- 
tives : Possibility 
of sin, evil, etc. 
Certain inconven- 
iences in the arts, 
etc. 



IX. NECESSITY. 



CERTAIN EXIST- 
ENCES. 

1. The fact of the 
necessary laws. 

2. Time, space, 
etc. (in which, the 
necessary laws in- 
here.) 



LIMIT OF POSSIBIL- 
ITIES. 

From space, 
time, number, 
quantity, exist- 
ence, motion, etc. 



FORCES. 

In connection 
with God — with 
man— with beasts, 
etc. 



X. NECESSARY EXISTENCES. 



NECESSARY 

FACTS. 

As time, space, 
etc, 



NECESSARY 
RELATIONS. 

As number, mo- 
tion, etc. 



NECESSARY 
LAWS. 

As that a thing 
cannot be and not 
be at the same 
time. 



220 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 



XI. CHANCE. 



From necessity and From nature 

God (laws and provi- and man. 

dence.) 



XH. THE NECESSARY LAWS IN THEIR RELA- 
TION TO THE ACTUAL. 

NECESSITY. POSSIBILITY. IMPOSSIBILITY, 



Fact Fact. Non-fact. Non-fact 



Appendix. 22 1 



II. APHORISMS. 

1. We have not undertaken to show what is true, so 
much as to show what is true in case certain other things 
are true which are commonly received as true, and which 
in some cases men cannot doubt. Again, we have tried 
to show what whole of things must be true in order that 
the set will be consistent. 

2. Our System is not in this Treatise, but in Nature. 
We can hope at most only to indicate here the direction 
which the student should take to find it in nature. 

3. If any say that we cannot know whether or not God 
is limited, and how, having never reached that height, 
we may answer that we know that the laws of triangles, 
circles, etc., hold every-where, even in the sun or in 
heaven, though we have never been there ; so that it 
cannot be said that these things are altogether above the 
reach of our mind. 

4. If any body objects to receiving the doctrine that 
the necessary laws are not produced because every thing 
must have a cause, we may ask, What, then, must be the 
cause of that law, namely, that every thing must have a 
cause ? If it can be without a cause, why not those in 
regard to a triangle ? 



222 Principles, of a System of Philosophy. 

5. The necessary laws are not changed by any of the 
changes that take place in things, change being only in 
the contingent. 



6. We cannot say that necessity is the cause of the pos- 
sibilities, but only that it incloses them, or is the limit of 
them, for they, existing always, could have no cause. 



7. [See Part I, chap, i.] If the necessary laws are not 
any force, and if what they seem to produce (as angles* 
circles, etc., when we draw the lines) existed before, and 
was only brought into notice by them, then we can say 
with regard to those things in the world of whatever 
kind, that we attribute to the necessary laws, that they 
too existed before, and that their further existence (as 
brought out by what we have done) is phenomenal. 
But we cannot say that they were produced by other 
causes. That they are a real force> however. See Part I, 
chap, ii, et seq. 



8. The necessary laws exist every- where, but determine 
no possibilities into facts. They are a blank in nature 
until some one of the active powers (G-od, man, etc.) 
does something. There is no limit to the necessary laws 
in the sense that they apply every-where. There is no 
force in them in the sense that, though they exist every- 
where, yet there may be nothing really existing any- 



Appendix. 223 

where. They are a force like space, which, though it 
produces nothing, can prevent some things from being 
produced by any power whatever, as for two bodies to be 
in the same part of it, or two different straight lines be- 
tween two points. Also, by preventing things from being 
one way it throws them into another form, [see Part I, 
chap, ii,] when it would otherwise be that other way, 
and so has power also to produce some things. 



9. To create is not to produce from nothing, seeing 
that there are already the necessary laws, which furnish 
something of what shall appear in the thing. The nec- 
essary laws, however, may be considered as part either 
of the creative power or of the material on which it 
works. They are in the cause, and appear also in the 
result. But this is like all creative power or cause, for 
it is always in the result. 



10. The necessary laws, with their net-work of possi- 
bilities, lie in the domain of nothing, as it were, and per- 
haps in one sense cannot be called existence even, for it 
is only when something is done that their power comes 
into existence. 



11. In nature there are two extensions, one in time, 
and one in space. A thing that existed only in space 
would be instantaneous. One that existed only in time 



224 Principles "of a System of Philosophy. 

would be a point in as far as it had any relation with 
space at all. Time has only one dimension, running from 
past to future. Space has three, commonly known as 
length, breadth, and thickness. 



12. There may be no such a thing as space and time, 
(that being only the imaginary domain in which we 
think things,) but there must be the necessary laws, 
which manifest themselves under the idea of space. We 
not being able to perceive the necessary laws in them- 
selves, comprehend them under this shape, that is, 
our knowledge of them gives rise to the phenomena of 
time and space (subjective). 

13. [See Part I, chap, i.] We can perhaps call the 
necessary laws parts of God, as the first truth on which 
they depend or in which they subsist. 

14. Necessity fills all space (and time, etc.) in the sense 
of the laws being there, (every-where ;) it fills none in the 
sense of there being existences. 

15. The necessary laws, then, fill every-where in the 
sense that they apply every-where. They fill nowhere 
at all in the sense that, unless certain conditions are met ? 
that is, certain things are done by other forces, they will 
not manifest themselves or have auy power. 



Appendix. 225 

16- We cannot say, perhaps, that there is such a thing 
as space or time ; but we can say certainly that there is 
the possibility of extension, of duration, etc. We should 
consider the possibilities in such cases rather than dis- 
cuss the real existence of space, time, etc. 



17. When we say space is infinite we mean merely 
that the possibilities of extension, etc., are infinite, or 
may be applied any where. So with time, number, etc. 



1 8. [See Table X.] Space and time seem to be differ- 
ent from number and motion, the first being existences 
per se, the others being merely relations (or possibility of 
relations) that are called into existence or manifestation 
only when there is something to be numbered or to be 
moved, as men, worlds, etc. 



19. [See Table IX.] There are, perhaps, necessary 
facts, as time, space, etc., and necessary laws, as that a 
thing cannot be and not be at the same time. The nec- 
essary laws inhere in the necessary facts. We cannot, 
however, well distinguish between that which has a real ex- 
istence, and that which comes forth as a power only when 
some other force is exerted. The necessary laws presup- 
pose the necessary facts, just as the law of gravitation 
or of impenetrability presupposes the matter. Further- 
more, the necessary facts are presupposed often for things 

15 



226 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

that are brought about by other laws (created) and other 
facts as well. 



20. [See Table IX.] Necessity may be considered as 
certain existences, as the limit of the possibilities, and as 
a force. 1. First as certain existences. By this we mean 
the fact of the laws holding a place, as, for example, the 
fact of it being a law that a thing cannot be and not be 
at the same time, that parallels cannot meet, etc. These 
we can call facts or certain existences ; not that there is 
any physical or tangible existence, or the like, but merely 
the fact that these relations hold — to express it approxi- 
mately. We may add to these facts space, time, number, 
etc. ; not that they are any real things, but they are the 
sphere, so to speak, or an expression of, the possibility of 
certain things that may be, as matter, mind, etc., that is, 
they are the sphere of certain contents. No other exist- 
ence, then, than this do we affirm of such things when 
we say that necessity contains under it certain existences 
or facts. 2. Necessity contains under it, again, the limits 
of the possibilities or fixing of the species. This it does 
by the crossing of its laws. For example, one law says 
that all right angles are equal, and another that a per- 
pendicular line falling on a horizontal makes right angles. 
Hence it cannot be that a perpendicular falling on a hori- 
zontal make one of the angles larger than the other. 
Thus necessity determines before any thing is done w r hat 
things are possible and what not, and the impossibilities 
or not-species can never be changed. 3. Necessity is, 



Appendix. 227 

again, a force — not, however, alone, but when some crea- 
tive power, as God or man, acts; for then it helps to 
bring about the result, as subsequently every thing exist- 
ing at the time does. 



21. [See Table IX, etc.] We must distinguish, again, 
between the necessary laws and the necessary results in 
case certain things are done to them. It is a necessary 
law that there is space, a necessary result that there is 
motion — in case some substance be created in a certain 
way. 



22. God may have a will that runs in accordance with 
the necessities, and that will may be free, that is, so as to 
wish them or not ; but yet it is not such that if he should 
will them not to be it would be of any avail. We can 
make God great enough to include the necessities ; but 
in so far he will be necessary, and it will be giving him 
no more power. It is like uniting a log to a man so as 
to be called a part of him. It will be making him larger, 
but give him no power over that part of his nature, and 
will also make him less free. If those necessities are so 
a part of God that he must always think and wish ac- 
cording to them, then he becomes committed to the nec- 
essary inconveniences that result from them, and his 
wishes, ideals, etc., are not of the more perfect kind 
that we can conceive of. 



228 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

23. That which is, is in part that which must be ; but 
not only does it include all that must be, but also some 
of the things that what-must-be merely allows, yet not 
all. That which is, then, is made up of all that must be, 
and of some things determined from what may be. 
When, however, certain things are once determined they 
render, as we have seen, certain other things necessary ; 
hence there follows another, necessity, one by reference 
to that determination of contingent things. All things 
that come into existence after that are in accordance 
with these two necessities. 

24. [See Table XI.] There is no chance in the sense 
that there are things that nothing has produced, (unless 
we can give this name to the necessary laws or to God.) 
But there is chance in the sense that there are things 
without design. 

25. [See Table IX.] In quantity we have something 
that is common with number — the more and the less. 
By quantity we do not mean substance, but the measure 
of it, as of any thing ; yet it is not the same as number, 
because in it unity may be as great as two or one hun- 
dred, or any plurality. 

26. God is not an absolute monarch, but bound by the 
necessary laws as by a constitution. The constitution is 
made up of two parts : 1. The natural necessity, which 



Appendix. 229 

lie could not violate if he would ; and 2. The moral or 
perfection necessity, which he will not violate because of 
his character. So God is limited by nature and by him 
self. 



27. What part of evil God does cannot be helped at 
all. What man does cannot be helped by God. 



28. The philosophy of history, or spirit of progress, or 
unity of the development of ideas, cannot be affirmed ab- 
solutely, since men are creating all the time, that is, pro- 
ducing more or less without any influence from previous 
causes. Nor can it be denied absolutely, since the things 
determined in the past have changed the possibilities of 
the future, and so marked out the lines in which man- 
kind could move thenceforth. 



29. The Nominalism of the Schoolmen is, perhaps, the 
same at ground as the Transcendentalism of Kant. The 
first is in regard to sensible species, as horse, tree, etc. ; 
the other to those of pure thought, as angles, circles, etc. 
Conversely, Realism is the same as Platonism for pure 
thought species, and as the Common-sense philosophy for 
such as horse, etc. (individuals). 

30. The right of property, of inheritance, etc., is 
founded in nature, or is against nature in no other sense 



230 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

than as follows : It is only several states of things that 
are left possible by the natural laws ; as, for example, that 
the owner shall be allowed to acquire as a free man as 
much as he can, or he must be limited more or less in 
the pursuit of his happiness. So, too, he must have the 
right to transmit or have less interest in his property, 
and so accomplish less with his powers. We say that 
the necessary laws impose some such alternatives as the 
only possibilities. They impose also the necessity of the 
State fixing by law how this shall be, for otherwise there 
will only be quarreling and confusion. Now by these 
necessities man holds his property ; and as we can con- 
ceive of no other right than the best state of things that 
is left possible by the necessary laws, (and others existing 
up to the time,) we can say that the person holding 
property according to the laws holds it by right, unless 
it can be shown that there is some other state of things 
possible that would, all respects being considered, be 
better. Of course there is no reason why one should 
have the property rather than another except that he has 
it. But this is a strong reason, inasmuch as it is one of the 
things required in the possibilities just explained, that a 
person should be allowed to hold his property when he 
once has it ; for, the same reason that makes property, 
and so industry, impossible in case there are no such 
general laws made, makes this particular case of posses- 
sion a right. He has no right more than any other, and 
for that reason — the equality of all — he has equal rights 
to acquire as the others have not to acquire, and he 



Appendix. 231 

should be protected, as the others should, in his liber- 
ties. It would show inequality if the actual proprietors 
were dispossessed for others who would be equally 
chance-comers into the possible possessions. 

31. A thing that is indifferent before a certain state of 
things is determined into fact may become a duty after- 
ward. Thus there are some things made right by the 
fact that they are established. This is the case with 
many laws, customs, etc., and it is wrong not to follow 
them. But observe that it is those that were indifferent 
before ; whereas for those that were wrong, or unwise to 
do, there is no reason why we should not, by a radical- 
ism that goes to the root of the wrong, seek for progress. 

32. What we call wisdom in God, or in us, is to deter- 
mine into facts those possibilities that will be the best, 
and will cause least evil. 



33. [See Part III, chap, ii.] In speaking of man as 
the author of evil, and of evil as resulting from sin, we 
meant of course those evils that are not among the ne- 
cessities, but which are avoidable in every form. JSTow 
the question may arise whether they are not all of the 
former kind, so that there is no evil in the world but 
what is necessary, and so no charge of sin on any one. 
"We find, however, that there is not among the necessi- 
ties, as far as we can see, any requirement that there 



232 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

should be any of the evils that we practically regard as 
men's. It is hard to think, for example, that drunken- 
ness, theft, murder, prostitution, oppression, and the like 
should be results from triangles, wholes, etc.— in short, 
from the principles of geometry, logic, and the other 
things that express the necessary laws ; or from these and 
the working of a perfect being, or a being who knows 
how to bring the best state of things possible out of 
them ; so that there must be other causes inferred. Yet, 
though we may admit this, that is not conclusive proof 
as yet that there is sin ; for though the evil would not 
result from God's working and the necessary laws, yet it 
may result from men's working, not because of any sin 
on their part, but because of impotence or imperfection. 
ISTor can God be charged with their imperfection, for it 
may be the best way left possible for him to make man, 
that is, to make him free to do some things, even though 
it be not possible for man to know always what is best 
to do ; so that evil may result in spite of God and of 
man. To prove the guilt of man in regard to evil we 
must have recourse to our experience, where we see that 
we sometimes do what we know not to be best, and 
what we are nevertheless not compelled to do. 

34. [See Part IV, chap, iv — on Prayer — ad fin.} We 
should not consider God as something afar off, but as a 
spirit moving through nature and us, being always as 
present to us as the law of gravitation ; for there is great 
probability that God must be continually working in us 



Appendix. 233 

in order that we can know things — as Malebranche, Leib- 
nitz, and others have shown, in framing their doctrine of 
occasional causes, diyine harmony, etc., to be necessary 
in order to account for our knowledge of the external 
world — so that his power is working in us as it is in na- 
ture ; and we should feel that our praying touches God 
as well as the volition touches matter ; for no sooner do 
I will than my hand goes forth and moves this pen. 
We know not how much of God's work (providence) 
must be in this in order that the movement can be ef- 
fected by the will, as it is evident that there is a great 
deal of his laws in it ; and so it may be in our thinking 
or more internal working. And if he is present to help 
on our thinking by his providence — our wishes, our will, 
etc. — so that they can perfect the comprehension of the 
thing wished, or the action which our volition starts, 
there is every reason to believe that he will be touched 
by our prayer, even if it be but a wish thrown at him 
unexpressed. We should feel that we are moving 
through God, and that what we do, and especially our 
prayers, effect changes in him and in his doings, as well 
as what we do with our hands makes a change on nature. 
All this is in harmony with what we have seen of our 
actions changing the possibilities in things, making him 
to depend on us for what he can possibly do after every 
moment, and depending on our action for what is " the 
best " to do at each successive instant. We can only 
look at ourselves and God as fellow-beings working to- 
gether in a common work, and inter-depending. 



234 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

35. [See Part IV, chiefly.] Mankind are now some- 
what advanced in determining the possibilities, and 
progress from this point is twofold: 1. To push forward 
the determination of the possibilities ; 2. To undo the 
things already done wherein they are not such as to 
allow us to reach the full measure of our possibilities. 
• Progress is accordingly either determinism or radical- 
ism. By the former we mean the advancement of the 
determination of facts from the possibilities, and by the 
other the undoing of what has been done, and so chang- 
ing the spirit or tendency of things which the past has 
set for the direction of the future, in order to determine 
them over again. It will be seen, then, that radicalism 
is only provisional, it being the preparing of the way for 
determinism ; so that that part of reform which consists 
in building up a new state should be put to the side of 
determinism, and not radicalism. In radicalism we 
contemplate, it is true, the building up again of some- 
thing; but that is an after-work, and the object of 
radicalism — not its work. We are to undo our character 
wherein bad, before attempting to build up a good ; just 
as we tear down the old house before building a new, 
and clear away the remains of an old regime before com- 
mencing another — all in order that we may get at a 
point from which we may have all the advantages of the 
original possibilities. Our work is, then, to proceed for- 
ward instead of backward. For in radicalism we go 
back — back toward the undetermined possibilities; for 
in as far as we are radical we are fighting history and 



Appendix, 235 

preferring nihilism to fact — putting ourselves back in 
the ages to where the things were not yet done. But 
when we have once cleared away the facts we go to the 
work of building up new history, and a history or struc- 
ture, be it observed, that is to be continually builded 
on; for our real progress is only in so far as we get 
permanent structures, or as we build each moment 
on what we builded before ; for the determinations of 
many of the possibilities are possible only after we have 
brought about a great many things, so that keeping al- 
ways back at our original state or starting point, were it 
possible, would be no progress, even if we should thereby 
keep free from errors. Thus radicalism supposes subse- 
quent rebuilding, and does not even suppose the com- 
plete destruction of previous determinations, but only 
some — those that are in the way of giving us the greatest 
liberty with the possibilities for the good ; for we can in 
great part build up our ideal on the facts already laid. 
Progress is, then, conservative as well as radical, and 
conservative not only after the thing has been built up 
anew^ but sometimes conservative of old facts. We 
must save the foundation if we will build the structure. 

In determinism and in radicalism we have seen that 
there are limits. We cannot do any of the impossibili- 
ties, nor undo any of the necessities. We are limited 
again in radicalism, and so indirectly in determinism, 
by the fact that we cannot undo altogether the past de- 
terminations. In fact, we cannot undo them at all, 
though we can withdraw ourselves out from under them 



236 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

so that their influence will not be felt, or but little felt, in 
the future. The thing that is determined is conserved 
forever — that is the creation— whether it be God or we 
that do it. Of this we have an axiom, that is, we know 
that things cannot be altogether the same afterward as 
if we had not done that ; in other words, all facts are 
conserved however they may be dispersed in nature. 
This is similar to the doctrine of the conservation of 
forces ; for the volition or fact which is the result of our 
mind-force, or creation, stands, and will continue forever — 
not perhaps in the form that it was done, but at least 
in its equivalent somewhere in nature. We cannot say, 
perhaps, that the force continues, or its equivalent — that 
is, the creation or determination of the possibility^— but 
the result ; for the result was produced in part by the 
necessary laws as well as (in some instances) by other 
laws, as we have seen, so that the result is not a proper 
measure of the force, but contains more. We can say, 
however, that the fact determined continues ; but, then, 
the empire of force or of fact, that is, the range within 
which they exist, is so unlimited that innumerable forces 
still might be put forth without encountering, or render- 
ing any difficulties to, subsequent forces. When we spit, 
for example, or whistle, that fact will continue as really 
as when a world is made or a man killed ; yet surround- 
ing nature is so big that it passes off without ever meet- 
ing us again in any of its effects; that is, the range in 
which force works is so wide that innumerable forces 
can run through it almost forever without encountering, 



Appendix. 237 

especially when the forces are so small. Here we may 
add, too, that while the conservation of determina- 
tions or of forces is true, it is yet not always important, 
seeing that the amount of force existing or increasing 
from time to time makes little difference that is percepti- 
ble. Another thing that makes the tenacity of facts less 
formidable, is, that no one thing determined by us is apt 
to be all in one form, so that even if the determination is 
a big thing it is not necessarily hard to resist. For ex- 
ample, while it is true that every thing I do has some 
effect on my character, as when I lie, or commit some 
cruelty, yet all the act or all the equivalent of the forces 
in operation (whether of the mind or of the laws) does 
not go into my character ; so that I have not, in order to 
change my character, to do a counter act as great as the 
first, but only what will offset what passed into my char- 
acter of it. Thus a man can often eradicate an evil trait, 
or destroy an evil any where in nature, with much less 
work than it was brought about ; for we are so con- 
structed that we can concentrate the whole effort against 
the thing. The undoing of a thing is not, perhaps, the 
destroying of the thing, but the dispersing of it in other 
forms or other kind of existence. Thus, a great appetite 
is not destroyed, but by work upon our system, will, etc., is 
rendered into another passion or taste, or into some force 
of a less distinctive kind. (For in an appetite there is 
excitability, etc., which is common to love, to thinking, 
etc., so that, certain relations being changed, that excita- 
bility may go to the mind instead of the appetite, and so 



238 Principles of a System of Philosophy. 

the appetite — as a desire for drink, etc. — be destroyed.) 
So a house may be destroyed, not by being annihilated, 
but by going off into earth or fire, and so taking the 
form of other forces in nature or equivalents for the pre- 
vious fact. So, too, a custom may be dispersed among 
the pride, the poverty, the dangers, etc., of a people, the 
same force existing somewhere, and things not indeed 
altogether as if there had not been that custom or the 
creations or determinations of facts which produced it, 
yet not so as to prevent the building up of another cus- 
tom or practical state of things as if that did not exist. 

It will be understood, then, what we mean when we 
speak of the undoing of past facts, and the determining 
of the possibilities anew, as if those facts had not been, 
and so getting back to the point where we shall have 
full advantage of what is possible for men, that is, limited 
only by the laws of nature. 

We must here make a distinction between the laws 
and facts, between the necessary laws and those of crea- 
tion on the one hand, and those of custom, legislation, 
individual facts, etc., on the other. For we cannot 
change any of the former in our radicalism, nor do any 
thing in our determinism rendered impossible by them. 
However, we can change the effects of them as of the 
other class ; and here we should make a further distinc- 
tion between the laws of necessity, etc., and the effects of 
them, (in part the effects of them.) For we are under 
the results of the laws of nature (we will so call the for- 
mer kind) in nearly all we do ; even in making a house, 



Appendix. 239 

as we have seen, they do a great part, as arrange the re- 
lations of the angles, the weight, (by the law of gravita- 
tion,) etc. Yet such things we can undo, as we have just 
seen, and so our characters, customs, etc., into which 
they enter more or less. Now the second class of laws 
are the result of the laws of nature, (in part,) and in at- 
tempting to change them we must go only so far as to 
attempt to change what is not nature, that is, what does 
not imply a change of the laws of nature. Thus there is 
w^hat we call human nature, female nature, childhood 
nature, etc., which embrace each a bundle of qualities, 
some of which we cannot get rid of, but others of which 
"we can ; so that when we speak of changing our nature, we 
should go no further than to include only what is not of 
the natural laws. It may be thought, for example, to be 
a part of human nature to fear when it thunders, sleep in 
the night, eat three times a day, for women to attend to 
household affairs, etc. ; and though it is true that these 
habits hold us with some force, yet we see that we can 
change them, either by an effort of the will, or by long 
practice, until we get ourselves into another state. But 
in contemplating all such changes we should be careful 
to arrest ourselves, at least at the laws ; for though we 
can change the habit of sleeping in the night time, we 
cannot change that of sleeping. Though we can change 
the habit of walking with our feet parallel, we cannot 
change to walking by throwing outward the toes without 
making the toes to be further apart than the heels, this 
contradicting the necessary laws as the former (to do 



240 Principles of a System of Philosophy, 

without sleep) those of creation. We can say, then, that 
though we may get the habit of walking with our feet paral- 
lel, the necessary laws will cause that our toes and our heels 
are equally distant from each other ; yet we can change 
this effect of the natural laws in our habits and walk so 
that the toes are farther apart than the heels. Yet we 
do this, not by changing the necessary laws, or by doing 
any thing contrary to them, but by changing the things 
that are changeable, when the necessary laws themselves 
will require the change of the toes and heels. So we 
may add that the natural laws even may aid us in our 
radicalism even in those cases where they have aided in 
building up another state of things. The difference be- 
tween a law and a fact, we may add, seems to be that 
the laws run all through nature, (the necessary laws 
every-where and always, and those of creation through 
the world or matter over which they were placed,) while 
a fact seems to be a changeable thing, having only a lim- 
ited empire in which to move or be scattered through 
other forms. 



THE EISTD. 



